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Some scholars, both Chinese and Western, have argued that 
the Chinese Constitution is no longer a classic “sham constitution,” 
and that it is in fact starting to fulfill, at least in a limited way, its 
power-delineating and rights-protecting functions.  They believe that 
signs have emerged that show that, at times, the Chinese Constitution 
does in fact influence the outcome of legislative debates, for example.  
This article argues that such optimism is misplaced, and that, 
at present, the Chinese Constitution does not carry any meaningful 
legal weight.  It does, however, perform an important political 
function: it is a tool for the Chinese Communist Party to engage in 
legitimacy-enhancing constitutional reform rhetoric.  At the same 
time, would-be reformers outside the ruling elite also use 
constitutionalist rhetoric to try to push the Party to live up to its 
reformist promises.  At present, however, these attempts by reformers 
outside the system have yet to bear any fruit.  
In this article, I use the analytical framework of authoritarian 
constitutionalism to investigate the 2013 constitutionalism debate 
inside China.  I argue that this debate demonstrated the ways in 
which the Party uses the constitution as a “false blueprint,” one that 
suggests a destination at which the Party has no intention of arriving.  
The debate also demonstrated a growing consensus among moderate 
reformist scholars on the need for reform.  In response to this 
consensus, the Party has had to turn to ultra-conservative voices to 
keep the moderates in check.  This balancing act highlights the 
difficulties that the Party faces in using the constitution to bolster 
continued one-party rule. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Former Wenzhou City Vice-Mayor Ye Jiren might seem like 
an unlikely poster child for constitutional reform.  Accused of misuse 
of power over the illegal allocation of land to a local company, Ye 
was convicted and sentenced to three years in prison in August 2013.  
According to local authorities, the misallocation of city land to the 
Shopping Basket Development Company cost the government more 
than 115 million RMB or, roughly, 18.5 million US dollars in lost 
revenues.1   
And yet, Ye’s case is deeply troubling.  He was held in a form 
of extra-legal incommunicado detention known as shuanggui, or 
double regulation, for over a year, from March 2011 to May 2012.  
Ye alleged that he was tortured during that time and pressured into 
                                                                                                               
1 Zhao Xiaoyan (赵小燕), Wenzhou Yuan Fushizhang Ye Jiren Lanyong Zhiquan Huo 
Xing San Nian, Jiashu Ni Shangsu (温州原副市长叶际仁滥用职权获刑三年，家属拟上
诉) [Former Wenzhou Deputy Mayor Ye Jiren Sentenced to Three Years for Abuse of 
Power—Family Plans to Appeal], ZHONGGO XINWEN WANG (中国新闻网) ［CHINA NEWS 
NET] (Aug. 16, 2013), http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2013/08-16/5173481.shtml. 
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making a false confession. 2   Furthermore, he claimed that the 
mistreatment continued when he was later transferred to police 
custody.  He was only allowed to see his lawyer, Wang Zhanxin, on 
September 7, 2012, roughly a year and a half after being detained.  In 
April 2013, more than two years after he had first been detained, his 
case finally went to trial.  
Ye maintained his innocence during his initial trial and 
claimed on appeal that he faced abuse so intense that he adopted a 
six-character mantra: busi, bucan, buchi: don’t die, don’t become 
crippled, and don’t go insane.3  
In September 2013, his case was cited by one of China’s most 
prominent constitutional law scholars, Central Party School Professor 
Cai Xia, as evidence of the increasing sense of insecurity among Party 
members.4  While the general public might believe that government 
officials possess great power, Cai argued that they can, in fact, be 
quite vulnerable.  When they enter into shuanggui, they leave all legal 
protections behind.  
Ye’s case shows that officials, no less than average citizens, 
might find themselves in need of the rights protections found in the 
Chinese Constitution.  Cai suggested that government officials caught 
in moments of candor would probably echo the sentiments of many 
academics, intellectuals, and activists who have called for immediate 
and wide-ranging reform.5  She went on to argue that constitutional 
reforms which would better protect individual rights, regardless of 
circumstances, would in fact find much support from within the Party.  
Cai’s talk was but one of many conversations on the need for 
constitutional reform in China that took place in 2013.  To be sure, 
China is no stranger to public discussion on constitutional reform, but 
the first ten months of 2013 saw a level of conversation on 
constitutionalism not seen in China in nearly a decade.  The debate 
drew hundreds of participants, including academics, public 
intellectuals, journalists, rights activists, state-affiliated think tank 
                                                                                                               
2 Wang Zhanxin & Zhuang Xinting, This Is a Classic Unjust and False Case (July 11, 
2013), http://qing.blog.sina.com.cn/3435245570/ccc1b002330040eq.html.  
3 Cai Xia (蔡霞), Xianzheng Minzhu Caineng Shi Zhongguo Changzhi Jiuan (宪政民
主才能使中国长治久安 ) [Only Constitutionalism Can Bring Long-term Peace and 
Stability to China), GONGSHI WANG (共识网) [CONSENSUS NET] (Sept. 2, 2013), http://www.
21ccom.net/articles/zgyj/xzmj/article_2013090291129.html.  
4 Id. 
5 Id. (“the feeling of crisis within the Party is also quite strong”). 
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researchers, and government officials. Virtually every prominent 
constitutional scholar weighed in, including several law school deans 
and a number of respected elder scholars whose ties to senior Party 
leaders are well known.  
Just as importantly, the debate reached a large number of 
private citizens.  It is likely that millions of citizens followed the 
debate, which raged first and foremost online and on Weibo,6 China’s 
version of Twitter.  The debate also (at least briefly, before state 
censors blocked further discussion) played out on the pages of 
China’s top newspapers and magazines, in the elite classrooms of 
Beijing, and in private salons across China.7  
The tenor of the debate has been described as “highly 
ideological,” with each side possessed of “theological” certainty.8  
One participant expressed regret over elements of “personal attack” 
and “demonization” in the debate.9  
And, as perhaps may be expected of a debate whose battle 
lines have remained static for years, few if any participants confessed 
to being convinced by any of the arguments of other camps.10  One 
prominent scholar prided himself and his comrades for “maintaining 
our composure, and not retreating, even a half step.”11 
Broadly speaking, three different camps took part in the 
debate: the Socialist Constitutionalists, the Liberals, and the Leftists, 
who were also referred to as Anti-Constitutionalists.  As their name 
                                                                                                               
6  At one point in late May, more than 7 million posts on Weibo referred to the 
constitution, a number that was reduced to 1.9 million by government censors soon thereafter.  
Li Qi & William Wan, China’s Constitution Debate Hits a Sensitive Nerve, WASH. POST 
(June 3, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2013/06/03/chinas-
constitution-debate-hits-a-sensitive-nerve. 
7  The fact that many of the key interventions in the debate were posted online—
including transcripts of public talks and roundtable discussions—meant that the debate 
attracted a truly global Chinese-speaking audience, and attracted interventions from 
members of the Chinese diaspora, both in other parts of Asia and in the West.  
8 Zheng Yongnian (郑永年), Zhongguo de Xianzheng Zhi Zheng Shuoming le Shenme? 
(中国的‘宪政’之争说明了什么?) [What Does China’s ‘Constitutional Governance’ 
Debate Mean?], AI SIXIANG (爱思想 ) [LOVE THOUGHT] (June 18, 2013), http://www.
aisixiang.com/data/64914.html. 
9 Id.  
10 An extensive—though by no means exhaustive—review of the written record of the 
debate by this author failed to generate even one example of a participant admitting to being 
convinced by arguments made by an opposing camp, or of having one’s mind changed by 
the arguments of another side.  
11 Hua Bingxiao (华炳啸), Fanxian Pai de Lilun Pingkun Ji Qi Sixue [反宪派的理论
贫困及其死穴 ] (The Theoretical Impoverishment and Achilles’ Heel of the Anti-
Constitutionalists), AI SIXIANG (爱思想) [LOVE THOUGHT] (July 3, 2013), http://www.
aisixiang.com/data/65356.html.  
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suggests, the Socialist Constitutionalists support constitutional 
reform under the leadership of the Communist Party.  Though they 
do not question the Party’s monopoly on political power, they believe 
that that power should be exercised through, and checked by, 
constitutional norms.  
The Liberals are skeptical that meaningful reform can take 
place under the existing constitutional framework, which, they often 
point out, constitutionally enshrines the leadership position of the 
CCP.  More generally, they profess greater skepticism of the Party’s 
willingness to enact constitutional reforms that will limit its own 
power, and therefore have thought more deeply about how to 
mobilize the Chinese public to push reluctant CCP leaders to move 
forward.  
The Anti-Constitutionalists are the smallest of the three 
groups.  Their arguments are based on classic socialist legal theory, 
which holds that there is no need to use constitutional norms to 
constrain either Party or state authority since both the Party and 
government institutions, particularly People’s Congresses, are the 
voice of the people.  Using rhetoric that is redolent of an earlier era 
in Chinese political history, they roundly excoriate Western 
constitutional systems as tools of oppression of the proletariat, and 
repeatedly suggest that those Chinese scholars who do support 
constitutional reform are in fact agents of foreign powers.  
The debate between these groups was triggered, almost 
certainly unintentionally, by China’s top leader, Party Secretary Xi 
Jinping.  Xi Jinping called for improved constitutional 
implementation in a speech marking the 30th anniversary of China’s 
constitution on December 5, 2012.12  
While the constitutional anniversary speech has become 
something of a political ritual, reformist scholars latched onto it 
nonetheless as an opportunity to push for reform.  As the debate raged 
over several months, members of various ideological camps made 
repeated reference to Xi’s remarks. Each camp tried to claim Xi for 
itself, even as senior Party leaders, including Xi himself, made 
statements and took actions very much at odds with a constitutional 
reform agenda.   
                                                                                                               
12  Yinan Zhao, Uphold Constitution, Xi Says, CHINA DAILY (Dec. 5, 2012), 
http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2012-12/05/content_15985894.htm (quoting Xi Jinping: 
“We must firmly establish, throughout society, the authority of the Constitution and the law 
and allow the overwhelming masses to fully believe in the law”). 
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In the early months of 2013, the debate moved steadily 
rightward, as moderate and liberal reformers found common ground 
on a core constitutional reform agenda. 13   This consensus was 
interrupted by a left-wing intervention in May. The left-wing attack 
featured both Leftist academic voices and, later in the summer, 
government officials.  Leftist voices were able to occupy most of the 
public ideological space throughout the summer with help from state 
censors.  The censors both pushed anti-constitutionalist pieces in the 
state media and online, and also censored pro-constitutional pieces in 
all outlets. 14   By late August, the Leftist rhetoric became rather 
heated: Leftists accused would-be constitutional reformers of seeking 
to overthrow the Communist Party.  
Moderates, who often refer to themselves as Socialist 
Constitutionalists, did not take this Leftist thrust lying down.  Instead, 
they responded with a massive number of commentaries and 
reasserted their views in scores of articles over several months.  Most 
of the commentaries could not be published in either official media 
outlets or more market-oriented periodicals.  By fall, the Leftist push 
eased, and the Socialist Constitutionalist moderates were allowed to 
have the last word, at least as far as the 2013 constitutionalism debate 
was concerned. The conversation had gone full circle, and the status 
quo ante was reaffirmed.  
The Party’s highly ambivalent response to this wide-ranging 
constitutional conversation varied from month to month, mixing 
elements of tolerance and repression. For the first few months of 2013, 
the academic conversation was allowed to proceed, with only 
minimal interference. At the same time, Party censors, ever vigilant 
about public involvement in such debates, blocked attempts by 
prominent media outlets to weigh in on the debate, most famously in 
the so-called Southern Weekend Incident in early January 2013. 
When the debate showed signs of garnering too much public attention, 
officials warned some of the most high profile participants to move 
on to other, less sensitive, topics.15   
                                                                                                               
13 In the Chinese context, conservatives are those who support the Party and often favor 
preservation the status quo; they occupy the left side of the political spectrum; those 
advocating liberal reforms, including constitutional reforms, are considered to be on the right.  
14 Zheng, supra note 8.  See also Qian Gang, The Uncertain Death of ‘Constitutionalism, 
CHINA MEDIA PROJECT (Sept. 2, 2013), http://cmp.hku.hk/2013/09/02/33944/.  
15 Author interviews, Beijing, October 2013 (on file with author).  
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol11/iss3/1
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As always, certain red lines were enforced.  When one 
Shanghai-based academic issued a critique that touched on sensitive 
aspects of Party history, including abuses during the pre-reform era 
and the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown, he was dismissed from 
his university post. This made him the only academic participant in 
the debate to lose his job over pro-constitutionalist statements.16  
Without doubt, 2013 was the high water mark of 
constitutional conversation in China over the past decade.17  But was 
the debate mere academic talk, or something more?  This article 
argues that the Chinese constitutional debate of 2013 served as a 
proxy for debate over the future of political and legal reform in 
China.18  As such, it offers important insights about shifting views 
among Chinese intellectuals about prospects for political-legal 
reform.   
A close reading of the debate reveals, first and foremost, a 
high degree of consensus among legal scholars and intellectuals on 
the need for wide-ranging constitutional reforms.  For many, calls for 
constitutional reform were directly tied to a sense of a growing crisis 
in Chinese governance manifested by official corruption, abuse of 
power, and social unrest.  
Equally important, the debate, and the Party’s response to it, 
highlighted the leadership’s view of the constitution as a political tool, 
rather than a legal blueprint. Rather than seeking substantive 
engagement with those calling for constitutional reform, the Party 
sought to manage the debate, using its usual array of tools, including 
censorship, promotion of anti-constitutional voices, and, when 
needed, direct intimidation, to ensure that the debate stayed within 
                                                                                                               
16 Andrew Jacobs, Chinese Professor Who Advocated Free Speech is Fired, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 10, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/11/world/asia/chinese-professor-who-
advocated-free-speech-is-fired.html?_r=0.  Although university officials explicitly linked 
Zhang’s dismissal to his constitutional writings, others saw his firing as retribution for his 
work as a rights lawyer in Shanghai.  Author interviews, December 2013 (on file with author).   
17 The last such national conversation on constitutional reform took place in 2003, in 
the wake of the Sun Zhigang case.  See Keith J. Hand, Citizens Engage the Constitution: The 
Sun Zhigang Incident and Constitutional Review Proposals in the People’s Republic of 
China, in BUILDING CONSTITUTIONALISM IN CHINA 221 (Balme and Dowdle, eds., 2009). 
18 As one commentator put it, “a seemingly academic, terminological debate is actually 
a political struggle . . . political interests are using an academic disguise to wage a fierce 
battle.”  Ge Weikun (葛惟昆), Xianzheng Zhi Zheng, Shi Di’er Ci Zhenli Biaojun Zhi Zheng 
(宪政之争, 是第二次真理标准之争) [The Constitutionalism Debate Is the Second 
Criterion of Truth Debate], GONGSHI WANG (共识网) [CONSENSUS NET] (Dec. 16, 2013), 
http://www.21ccom.net/articles/zgyj/xzmj/article_2013121697087.html.   
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acceptable limits. In essence, when asked to respond to those voices 
arguing in favor of constitutional development, the Party had nothing 
politically inspiring or new to say.19  It favored political management 
over substantive engagement, even with moderate voices who largely 
support the Party.  
This study of the 2013 Constitutionalism Debate is not only 
of interest to scholars of Chinese politics and law.  Because the debate 
illustrates the ways in which authoritarian regimes use constitutions 
and constitutionalism to enhance their own political legitimacy, it 
also contributes to the study of comparative constitutionalism and to 
the growing discourse on authoritarian constitutionalism.  
While the 2013 Constitutionalism Debate garnered much 
attention in China, and also some Western media and scholarly 
attention, this article is the first in-depth analysis that looks at the 
debate through the theoretical lens of authoritarian constitutionalism.  
It is also one of the first in-depth studies of the political uses of 
constitutionalism in an authoritarian state, both from the perspective 
of the regime and from the perspective of would-be reformist 
elements outside the regime itself.  
As many scholars have noted, constitutions can in fact play a 
number of different roles in authoritarian political systems.  This is 
contrary to the conventional view that authoritarian constitutions are, 
in essence, dead letters.  The fact that the Chinese Constitution was 
at the center of debate over political reform in 2013 speaks to its 
relevance as a political document, one that can and does play a 
significant role in elite discourse over the path and pace of political 
reform.  
From the Party’s perspective, however, the constitution is a 
double-edged sword.  It seeks to use the Constitution and 
constitutional discourse as a source of political legitimacy: Party 
leaders know that constitutional rhetoric is attractive to Chinese 
intellectuals, citizens, and even reform-minded Party members.20  But 
                                                                                                               
19 Zheng, supra note 8.  Zheng argued that the constitutional debate highlighted the 
“decline of official discourse.”  In Zheng’s view, “for the past several years, official ideology 
no longer produces new theories or concepts,” and is instead focused on maintaining 
ideological control, even as Chinese society undergoes rapid change.  This emphasis on 
control over new thinking aptly describes the Party’s apparent goals in the 2013 
constitutional debate.  
20 The potential political benefits to a regime of touting its constitutionalist credentials 
have long been clear to both scholars and politicians alike.  In 1962, the political theorist 
Giovanni Sartori noted that, “[i]n our minds, constitution is a ‘good word.’  It has favorable 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol11/iss3/1
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it has no interest in political reforms that would institutionalize, and 
thus constrain, the Party’s use of power.  Therefore, the challenge for 
the Party is to constantly present itself as in transition by taking steps 
toward constitutional reform without ever actually getting there.  It 
must present the 1982 Constitution as a genuine blueprint for political 
system reform,21 even though it has no intention of making use of it.  
I call this the false blueprint paradigm of authoritarian 
constitutionalism.  
For many, the fact that the CCP sees the 1982 Constitution as 
a tool to reinforce its political legitimacy, and not as a roadmap for 
political system reform, comes as no surprise.  Many scholars have 
long argued that the Chinese Constitution is a classic “sham” 
constitution, which bears little resemblance to established political 
practice in China. 22   Yet, the past several years have seen the 
emergence of a new stream of scholarly literature which argues that 
China is in the early stages of constitutional development.  In the 
words of one scholar, “recognizable constitutional structures are, in 
fact, beginning to appear in China.”23  I argue that this growing body 
of scholarship misunderstands political and legal development trends 
in China, and misclassifies those limited reforms that have taken 
place as “constitutional” when they are better understood much more 
narrowly, as specific, technical legal reforms whose influence on 
future constitutional developments are uncertain at best.  
These scholars also misunderstand the largely political goals 
of the CCP when it engages in pro-constitutionalist rhetoric: for the 
Party, the 1982 Constitution is not a means by which power can be 
put in a “cage of regulations,” but, rather, a tool for enhancing its own 
political legitimacy.  The Party, therefore, has to walk its own fine 
line.  As I document in this article: it must regularly publicly proclaim 
that the Chinese state is “in transition” to constitutional governance, 
                                                                                                               
emotive properties, like freedom, justice or democracy.  Therefore, the word is retained, or 
adopted, even with the association between the utterance ‘constitution’ and the behavioral 
response it elicits . . . becomes entirely baseless.”  Giovanni Sartori, Constitutionalism: A 
Preliminary Discussion, 56 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 853, 855 (1962).  
21  Tom Ginsburg & Alberto Simpser, Introduction to CONSTITUTIONS IN 
AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 1, 8 (Tom Ginsburg & Alberto Simpser, eds., 2013).  As discussed 
in more detail below, Ginsburg and Simpser argue that authoritarian constitutions can serve 
as blueprints for future reforms, “describing things not as they are but as they might be.”   
22 David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, Sham Constitutions, 101 CAL. L. REV. 863 (2013).  
23 Michael Dowdle, Of Comparative Constitutional Monocropping: A Reply to Qianfan 
Zhang, 8 INT’L J. CONST. L. 977 (2010).  
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without actually arriving at the final destination.24  I call this the 
authoritarian constitutional dilemma.  
This article proceeds in five sections.  In Part I, I analyze the 
existing scholarly literature on authoritarian constitutionalism, and 
the ways in which China fits into the authoritarian paradigm.  I also 
argue that the CCP uses the Chinese Constitution as a source of 
political legitimacy, even though it largely fails to adhere to its key 
provisions.  
In Part II, I describe and analyze the first stage of the debate, 
which ran from December 2012 to May 2013.  I argue that this first 
stage of the debate highlights the ways in which external actors 
attempt to use constitutionalist rhetoric to push the Party to engage in 
political reforms.  I also describe and analyze the constitutional 
theories of the top two constitutionalist schools in China, the Socialist 
Constitutionalists and the Liberal Constitutionalists.  
In Part III, I describe the second phase of this debate, in which 
the Leftists, or anti-constitutionalists, came to the fore.  Rather than 
writing such voices off as irrelevant fringe elements, I argue that such 
voices are in fact a key tool of the state used to cool down 
constitutional debates before they potentially gain too much 
momentum and thus spin out of control.  I further argue that the use 
of this tool demonstrates the extent to which the Party values its 
control over the constitutional document—for the Party, the 1982 
constitution may be legally irrelevant, but it is by no means politically 
so.  
In Part IV, I analyze the responses to this Leftist push, and 
describe the wind-down of the 2013 debate.  I argue that, from the 
Party’s perspective, the goal was to return to the status quo ante, in 
which mainstream voices can praise the Constitution and call for 
constitutional reform, but must stay within politically acceptable 
limits.  In the concluding section, I describe the revival of state-led 
constitutionalist rhetoric in late 2014.  This revival shows that the 
Party was anxious to return to legitimacy-enhancing constitutionalist 
rhetoric after a long hiatus.  
 
                                                                                                               
24 Thomas Carothers, The End of the Transition Paradigm, 13 J. DEMOCRACY 5 (2002).  
Though Carothers describes the overuse of the term transition in the context of development 
of democracy, much of what he describes is also relevant to the study of constitutional 
development.  
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II. THEORETICAL CONCERNS: AUTHORITARIAN 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND CHINA 
 
Any debate over the political and legal relevance of the 
Chinese Constitution, or of authoritarian constitutions in general, 
starts with a simple question: why bother?  What positive role can a 
constitution play for a regime that, in most cases, has no intention of 
following its precepts?25   Why are constitutions of such value to 
authoritarian rulers that virtually every authoritarian regime—to the 
neo-totalitarian Kim dynasty in North Korea to the soft authoritarian 
regimes in Malaysia and Singapore—adopts one? 26   For its part, 
China has adopted four separate constitutions during the sixty-seven 
year history of the People’s Republic, and has amended the most 
recent 1982 Constitution four times, in 1988, 1993, 1999, and 2004.  
Surely such extensive attention to constitutional drafting and re-
drafting suggests that authoritarian rulers see some benefit to creating 
and maintaining a constitutional document.  
Ginsburg and Simpser identify four key functions of 
constitutions in authoritarian states: they can act as operating 
manuals, billboards, blueprints, and window dressing.27  
Not every element of an authoritarian constitutional document 
is false. For many authoritarian rules, maintaining a constitutionally-
mandated allocation of authority between different state actors can be 
beneficial, even though doing so may limit the ruler’s freedom of 
action.  As Ginsburg and Simpser point out, adherence to such a 
constitutional structure might lessen the likelihood of friction or even 
conflict among different governmental actors, and also encourage 
cooperation between intra-state elements by laying out clearly-
defined rules of the game.28   Ginsburg and Simpser call this the 
“operating manual” function of an authoritarian constitution.  
Admittedly, this function does have some limited 
applicability in the Chinese context.  Chinese officials, including 
many would-be reformists, put great stock in the preeminent 
constitutional role of China’s legislative body, the National People’s 
                                                                                                               
25 Ginsburg & Simpser, supra note 21, at 2.  
26 For an extended analysis of whether a genuine form of authoritarian constitutionalism 
could exist in certain soft authoritarian regimes, see Mark Tushnet, Authoritarian 
Constitutionalism: Some Constitutional Issues, in CONSTITUTIONS IN AUTHORITARIAN 
REGIMES 36, 36–49 (Tom Ginsburg & Alberto Simpser, eds., 2014). 
27 Ginsburg & Simpser, supra note 21, at 6.  
28 Id.  
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Congress (NPC)  The NPC is granted extensive powers under the 
1982 Constitution, but given the Party’s complete control of all state 
organs and the fact that no state actor can exercise its constitutionally-
vested powers independent of Party interference, the operating 
manual function to Chinese constitutional practice is only slightly 
relevant.  
Even those provisions of the Chinese Constitution which are 
facially adhered to—those that limit senior officials to two terms in 
office, for example—are not fully implemented.29  Throughout the 
reform era, it has been the practice of top officials to continue to 
exercise power for years, even decades, after they formally 
relinquished their posts.30  
In both authoritarian and liberal systems, perhaps the most 
common function of constitutional documents is the billboard 
function.  Because a nation’s constitution occupies a prominent place 
– at least rhetorically, if not in practice, in authoritarian systems – in 
the domestic political order, an amendment that signals a change in 
the authoritarian ruler’s governing philosophy or policy direction can 
be seen as both authoritative and definitive.  Such a change can 
capture the attention of both the domestic polity and international 
observers.  This signals to both audiences that they should look 
closely at a change that the regime itself sees as significant. 
The CCP has made liberal use of the billboard function 
throughout its tenure.  The 1954 Constitution, the PRC’s first such 
document, emphasized the leadership position of the Communist 
Party, signaling the importance that the CCP placed on consolidating 
its rule.31  The 1975 Constitution, with its extensive use of radical 
leftist rhetoric, is little more than a billboard for various extreme 
Cultural Revolution-era slogans. 32   The adoption of the 1982 
                                                                                                               
29 Article 79 of the Constitution, for example, limits the President and Vice-President 
of the PRC to two five-year terms. XIANFA art. 79 (China) (1982). 
30  It is true, however, that succession politics have become more and more 
institutionalized over the past two decades.  See Andrew J. Nathan, Authoritarian Resilience, 
14 J. DEMOCRACY 6 (2003). However, this institutionalization process has largely been 
conducted by the Party rather than the state.  If the Party were to alter its approach, 
presumably the state structure would follow.  More importantly, Party hierarchies, including 
informal ones, continue to trump the formal constitutional power structure and rules.   
31 William C. Jones, The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, 63 WASH. U. 
L. REV. 707, 712 (1985) (“[t]he 1954 constitution showed that the new government regarded 
itself as firmly established.  Military and political control were complete.”).  
32  Jerome Alan Cohen, China’s Changing Constitution, 76 CHINA Q. 794 (1978).  
Interestingly, Cohen notes that the 1975 Constitution, adopted just as the Cultural Revolution 
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Constitution, with its stronger pro-market reform and rule of law 
rhetoric, was seen by many observers as the Party’s way of sending a 
message to both the Chinese public and to the international 
community that China’s post-Mao leadership team was serious about 
economic and legal reform.33  Future amendments, including a series 
of amendments in 2004 which reaffirmed the state’s role in protecting 
human rights and strengthened language relating to private property 
rights, 34  generally sought to reinforce these pro-market and legal 
reform messages.  
Ginsburg and Simpser describe the window dressing role as 
“one in which the text is designed to obfuscate actual political 
practice.” 35  The rights provisions of the Chinese Constitution, which 
are not legally enforceable and which are, in practice, regularly 
violated, are one key example of window dressing.  One probable 
reason why authoritarian constitutions include such provisions is that 
they are now considered de rigueur: without them, a constitution is 
seen as incomplete. For many, the absence of such provisions would 
likely be so glaring as to undermine the entire document.36  In other 
words, leaving out such window dressing would subvert the key 
legitimacy-enhancing goals of the constitutional drafting project.  
Finally, Ginsburg and Simpser argue that authoritarian 
constitutions can serve as blueprints for future reforms, “describing 
things not as they are but as they might be.” 37   As an example, 
Ginsburg and Simpser cite Mexico’s 1917 constitution, which 
contained a number of progressive economic and social rights 
provisions including rights to land and education for the Mexican 
peasantry.  Although not legally actionable at the time of their 
                                                                                                               
was winding down, may have incorporated many radical political slogans that, by the time 
the Constitution was formally promulgated, were losing favor.  Id. at 802–803.  Pragmatists 
were gaining ground on the radicals within the Party leadership, and they dimmed the lights 
on the radical billboard that had been so painstakingly constructed.  
33  Hungdah Chiu, The 1982 Chinese Constitution and the Rule of Law, 11 REV. 
SOCIALIST L. 143 (1985). See also Jones, supra note 31.  
34 QIANFAN ZHANG, THE CONSTITUTION OF CHINA: A CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS 57 (2012).  
35 Ginsburg & Simpser, supra note 21, at 7.  
36 See Tom Ginsburg, Zachary Elkins & James Melton, The Content of Authoritarian 
Constitutions, in CONSTITUTIONS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 143 (Tom Ginsburg & 
Alberto Simpser, eds., 2014) (“there are very few statistically significant differences between 
authoritarian and democratic constitutions when controlling for other factors . . . [this 
convergence] indicates a continual process of lagged adaptation by authoritarians, who seek 
to model their texts on those of their democratic counterparts”).    
37 Ginsburg & Simpser, supra note 21, at 8.  
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drafting, these provisions nonetheless may have influenced 
subsequent Mexican land reforms which did in fact redistribute a 
significant amount of farmland to Mexican peasants.38  
One could argue that steps by the CCP to enhance the 
authority of the National People’s Congress39 and the quality and 
integrity—if not the independence—of the judicial system 40  are 
examples of the application of the blueprint role in the Chinese 
context. In my view, the incomplete, even stalled nature of these 
reforms means that the blueprint model is somewhat limited in its 
application in contemporary China.41  While state organs exercise 
greater authority than they did at the onset of the reform era, it 
remains the case that all virtually all important decisions are made by 
Party officials, and are then ratified by state organs.42  
Also, the notion of a blueprint implies a desire to reach a 
certain constitutionally-described destination.  As I argue below, 
there is little if any evidence to suggest that state-led reforms are in 
fact geared toward creating the constitutionally-mandated 
governance structure.  For that reason as well, the blueprint concept 
has limited application in the Chinese context.  
That does not mean, however, that the idea of the constitution 
as an authoritarian reformist blueprint is irrelevant to the Chinese 
context.  The fact that the Chinese Constitution lays out a system of 
constitutional governance and rights protection similar to fully-
developed liberal constitutional regimes allows the CCP to use the 
                                                                                                               
38 James J. Kelly, Jr., Article 27 and Mexican Land Reform: the Legacy of Zapata’s 
Dream, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. J., 541 (1994).  
39  Michael William Dowdle, Of Parliaments, Pragmatism, and the Dynamics of 
Constitutional Development: The Curious Case of China, 35 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1 
(2002). See also KEVIN J. O’BRIEN, REFORM WITHOUT LIBERALIZATION: CHINA’S NATIONAL 
PEOPLE’S CONGRESS AND THE POLITICS OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE (2008).  
40 Benjamin L. Liebman, China’s Courts: Restricted Reform, 191 CHINA Q. 620-638 
(2007).  But see Randall Peerenboom, Judicial Independence in China: Common Myths and 
Unfounded Assumptions, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN CHINA: LESSONS FOR GLOBAL RULE 
OF LAW PROMOTION 69, 74 (Peerenboom, ed., 2010) (arguing that while the independence 
of individual judges in the Chinese court system remains weak, the “collective independence 
of the Chinese courts has been strengthened through increased budgets, more streamlined 
and efficient processes, and efforts to increase the authority of the courts”).  
41 See Carl F. Minzner, China’s Turn Against Law, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 935 (2011).   
42 Christopher K. Johnson and Scott Kennedy, China’s Un-Separation of Powers: The 
Blurred Lines of Party and Government, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (July 24, 2015), 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2015-07-24/chinas-un-separation-powers.  
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constitutional document as a legitimacy-enhancing tool.43 
It is this legitimacy-enhancing function that creates a fifth role.  
In this Article, I argue that, for the CCP, and likely for other 
authoritarian regimes as well, the constitution has a fifth function that 
is related to, but is somewhat distinct from, the other four.  That fifth 
function is a false blueprint. As noted above, the CCP has shown little 
if any intention of actually moving forward with a set of reforms that 
would, formally and finally, institutionalize the exercise of political 
power within state organs.  Instead, the Party seeks to use the 
Constitution to legitimize its rule by maintaining the political fiction 
that China is transitioning to constitutional governance.  
This false blueprint function also highlights another purpose 
of the window-dressing language found in authoritarian constitutions.  
If an authoritarian constitution is going to be successfully presented 
to elite audiences and the general public as a false blueprint, it needs 
to contain provisions that lay out a transition to a constitutionalist 
governance structure by increasing protections for individual rights.  
Without such window dressing language, the state cannot—
disingenuously—point its citizens towards a final outcome.  
Maintaining the false blueprint requires the CCP to walk a 
very fine line: it needs to regularly extoll the values found in the 1982 
Constitution, while obscuring the fact that it has no intention of living 
up to them.  In other words, it has to talk the talk of constitutionalism, 
all while avoiding walking the walk.  It needs to be perpetually “in 
transition” without ever arriving anywhere. 44   I call this the 
authoritarian constitutional dilemma.  
Perhaps, unsurprisingly, such a balancing act gets more and 
more difficult over time.  More and more observers—including 
academics, intellectuals, and activists—start to lose faith in the 
Party’s commitment to reforms that they pledge to make over and 
over again.  In other words, authoritarian governments face a 
significant temporal challenge of authoritarian constitutional 
legitimacy.  How (and whether) an authoritarian regime can maintain 
                                                                                                               
43 For an excellent study of the ways in which the CCP uses institutional reform to 
enhance its political legitimacy, see Bruce Gilley, Legitimacy and Institutional Change: the 
Case of China, 41 COMP. POL. STUD. 259 (2008).  Gilley focuses less on the Chinese 
Constitution, and more on broader political reforms that, in some cases, dovetail with 
constitutional norms.  See also BRUCE GILLEY, THE RIGHT TO RULE: HOW STATES WIN AND 
LOSE LEGITIMACY (2009).  
44  Carothers, supra note 24.  Though Carothers is focused on transition to liberal 
democracy, many of his insights are relevant to constitutional development within a one-
Party system.  
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the legitimacy-enhancing benefits of constitutionalist rhetoric over 
time is a very interesting question, one that China’s experience, both 
in 2013 and over the past thirty years of reform, can shed light on.  
For a number of reasons, the CCP faces particularly 
significant difficulties in maintaining the public’s belief in the false 
paradigm.  First and foremost, the CCP has been offering up 
Constitutional reform rhetoric for quite some time. For over thirty 
years, since the passage of the 1982 Constitution, the CCP has touted 
its efforts to develop constitutionalism.  Over that time, the Party has 
twice proclaimed December 4 as a day of reflection on the importance 
of constitutional values. In 1982, the CCP dubbed December 4 as 
“Implement Constitution Day,” and in 2014, December 4 became 
“National Constitution Day.”  In effect, the Party was trying to get 
double the political mileage out of the same propaganda tool. 
A second difficulty for the CCP in maintaining public buy-in 
for the false blueprint is the emergence of a much more diverse and 
pluralistic intellectual class that can expose the public to a much 
broader range of ideas.  In particular, the emergence of a growing 
number of liberal constitutional voices—a group that did not really 
exist a generation ago—poses a significant challenge to the Party’s 
efforts to maintain the public façade of its false blueprint.  As the 
2013 debate demonstrated, Liberals are often the only group willing 
to directly and publicly question the sincerity and validity of the 
Party’s constitutionalist rhetoric.  But for those liberal voices, it 
would be much easier for the Party to maintain its false 
constitutionalist credentials.  
Finally, the Internet revolution also makes it more difficult for 
the Party to maintain public belief in the false blueprint.  In 
contemporary China, constitutional reform can become a question of 
public debate, and views can be expressed—more often than not, 
indirectly—about whether or not constitutional reform will move 
forward anytime soon.  This is exactly what happened in 2013: an 
unprecedented number of individual citizens followed the academic 
debate online, many expressing their own support for constitutional 
implementation as they did so.  
Though I discuss only the case of China in this article, the 
ideas I raise here, including the false blueprint paradigm, the 
authoritarian constitutional dilemma, and the temporal challenge of 
authoritarian constitutionalism, are relevant to the study of 
authoritarian constitutionalism more generally.  The former Egyptian 
authoritarian ruler Hosni Mubarak, for example, amended the 
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Egyptian constitution in 2005 and 2007, claiming that such reforms 
were putting Egypt on the path to fuller electoral democracy.45  He, 
too, sought to put forward a false blueprint for constitutional 
development.  Just days before his ouster in 2011, Mubarak put 
forward further constitutional reforms in a last-ditch effort to mollify 
thousands of street protesters who demanded his resignation.  Those 
efforts failed in part because, after three decades in power with little 
to show in the way of institutional reforms, Mubarak’s 
constitutionalist promises rang hollow.  In some ways, Mubarak’s 
downfall represented an extreme case of the temporal challenge: he 
simply could not maintain the political viability of constitutional 
reform rhetoric over time.  
 
A. The False Blueprint in China: Constitutional Reform or 
Rhetorical Tool? 
 
In this section, I argue that failure to understand the role of 
the Chinese Constitution as a legitimacy-enhancing false blueprint 
has led some scholars to overstate either the potential for 
constitutional reform within the existing structure, or the extent to 
which constitutional reform (as opposed to legal reform) has already 
taken place. While such efforts might seem constructive in that they 
seek to highlight the developmental potential of the existing Chinese 
Constitution, even within the limits of one-party rule, nonetheless 
such approaches can have a downside:  they can put a positive gloss 
on the status quo, which, in turn, helps the Party legitimize 
authoritarian rule.  
At the risk of stating the obvious, China has made much 
progress on legal reform over the thirty years since the reform and 
opening era began.  But framing what may often be genuine reforms 
as evidence of constitutional development may overstate the nature 
of the change, and also falsely suggest a potential for robust 
institutional development along constitutional lines.  Because the 
Party embarked on another round of constitution-based public 
messaging in late 2014,46 it makes sense to look very closely at what 
                                                                                                               
45 Kristen Stilt, Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes: The Egyptian Constitution of 
1971, in CONSTITUTIONS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 111 (Tom Ginsburg & Alberto 
Simpser, eds., 2014).  
46 Rules of the Party, THE ECONOMIST (Nov. 1, 2014), http://www.economist.com/
news/china/21629528-call-revive-countrys-constitution-will-not-necessarily-establish-rule-
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2018
354 U. PA. ASIAN L. REV.                         [Vol. 11 
 
reformist efforts have achieved – and what they have not achieved—
over the past decade, and how best to classify those reforms that have 
taken place.  
In essence, despite the limited progress that China has made 
on legal reform over the past decade, China’s constitution remains a 
sham constitution,47 one that, on balance, simply does not describe 
the system of governance in place in China today. 48   Its rights 
provisions remain unenforceable, and the allocation of powers to 
different state entities it describes is fundamentally compromised by 
Communist Party oversight—not to say usurpation—of the exercise 
of those powers.  Nor can China’s constitution be called aspirational: 
given the lack of a functional interpretative mechanism, it seems 
unlikely that constitutional rights provisions that are currently 
inactive will be given life anytime soon.49 
This may seem like an uncontroversial contention.  But in 
recent years, a small but growing body of scholarly literature has 
questioned the Chinese Constitution’s moribund status.  A number of 
authors, both Chinese and Western, have sought to draw attention to 
various reformist efforts in which the constitution was invoked, in 
order to argue that China is taking steps toward genuine constitutional 
governance. 50   Michael Dowdle, for example, has stated that 
“recognizable constitutional structures are, in fact, beginning to 
appear in China,” and cautions that less careful observers of China’s 
constitutional development might miss the “powerful potentiality” of 
the constitutional document.51 
To be sure, the majority of these authors warn that it is too 
early to say whether China will continue to develop into a full-blown 
constitutional state (even if one that is still authoritarian in 
character). 52   They do, however, believe that there is more 
                                                                                                               
law-rules.  
47 Law & Versteeg, supra note 22.  
48 Xin He, The Party’s Leadership as a Living Constitution in China, in CONSTITUTIONS 
IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 245 (Tom Ginsburg & Alberto Simpser, eds., 2014) (“China’s 
constitution . . . does not tell how the state actually operates”).  
49 Michael C. Dorf, The Aspirational Constitution, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1631 (2009). 
50 Dowdle, supra note 23.  See also Dowdle, supra note 39, at 2 (“China provides us 
with a prime example of significant constitutional development in an otherwise authoritarian 
regime . . . [readers should pay attention to] significant evidence of constitutional 
development in China”).  
51 Dowdle, supra note 23.  
52  Stephanie Balme & Michael W. Dowdle, Introduction to BUILDING 
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN CHINA 2 (Stephanie Balme & Michael W. Dowdle , eds., 2009) 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol11/iss3/1
2016]                     ARGUING CHINESE CONSTITUTIONALISM     355 
 
constitutional activity than meets the eye, and that closer scrutiny is 
needed.  
I believe that these scholars run the risk of overstating recent 
developments.  I also question whether framing what progress has 
been made as truly constitutional in nature makes sense.  My concern 
is this: constitutional framing may mischaracterize essentially 
political debates as legal or constitutional ones; may overstate the 
impact and permanence of those changes that have taken place; and 
may overstate the capacity of the system for long-term constitutional 
development at the institutional level.  
To be sure, countries that are in transition to constitutionalism 
may not yet possess all of the elements of constitutional 
governance.53  But in order to be in transition, a system must be 
actively developing the institutions (judicial or otherwise) that will 
interpret the constitution, and apply such interpretations to laws, 
regulations, and the state use of power more generally.  Such a system 
would also be beginning to adopt some set of institutional checks and 
balances, so that each branch of government was constrained in its 
use of power, both by the constitutional document itself, and by the 
exercise of power by the other branches.54  Without these two core 
elements – or at least the beginnings of these core elements—then it 
is hard to argue that constitutional development is underway.  
It is true that, contrary to what once was the established view, 
authoritarian systems can in fact successfully integrate into their 
governance structures constitutional norms that genuinely constrain 
authoritarian rulers.  As Barros has shown, the Chilean military junta 
under the leadership of Augusto Pinochet subjected itself to 
institutionalized constraints; Barros refers to the Chilean experience 
as a key example of what he calls “authoritarian self-limitation.”55  
                                                                                                               
(“[w]hat we find in China . . . is a transitional constitutionalism whose future success is by 
no means certain, but whose dynamics and possibilities are significantly more interesting 
and robust than generally is recognized at present”).   
53 Id.  See also Tushnet, supra note 26.  
54 This application of core elements to transitional constitutions is by no means unique 
to this article.  Giovanni Sartori, for example, argues that, in essence, a constitution is “a 
fundamental law, or a fundamental set of principles, and a correlative institutional 
arrangement, which would restrict arbitrary power and ensure a ‘limited government.’”  
Sartori, supra note 20, at 855.  Though Sartori was speaking of constitutionalist systems in 
general, his emphasis on institutions that restrict the use of political power is, I believe, at 
the heart of what a developing constitutional system must be aiming for in order to be truly 
in transition towards genuine constitutionalism.  
55 ROBERT BARROS, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DICTATORSHIP: PINOCHET, THE JUNTA, 
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In some ways, the Chilean experience sheds light on the lack 
of progress in China.  While the Chinese Party-state has been forced, 
on occasion, to take action in response to external reformist 
pressures,56 it has never fully implemented any reforms that would 
institutionalize political power along constitutional lines.  The past 
three decades are rife with examples of half-measures and abortive 
reforms that, if they had been zealously implemented and built upon, 
might have served to constrain Party power in some meaningful 
way.57  The fact that the CCP has not done this speaks to its own lack 
of interest in authoritarian self-limitation.  
Perhaps the clearest signal of the Party’s lack of interest in 
subjecting itself to institutional constraints comes from the Party 
itself.  In his comprehensive survey of the CCP’s responses to the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, Shambaugh shows that the CCP 
engaged in an intensive study of the demise of the Soviet system in 
order to learn from—and, the CCP leadership hoped, avoid—the 
mistakes that Soviet leaders made.58  According to Shambaugh, the 
studies carried out by various Party-affiliated think tanks and scholars 
identified a range of economic, political, and cultural factors that led 
to the collapse of the Soviet Union, not least among them the 
“dogmatic, ossified, inflexible, (and) bureaucratic ideology and 
thinking” of many top Soviet leaders, with the exception of 
Gorbachev.59   
Shambaugh also notes that official studies pointed to the 
dangers of many of the “Rightist” (liberal) reforms instituted by 
Gorbachev, including “advocacy of pluralist ideology,” “negating the 
leadership position of the Communist Party,” separating Party and 
                                                                                                               
AND THE 1980 CONSTITUTION 16–28 (2002).  
56 See discussion of the Sun Zhigang case, infra at 21–23.  
57 One key example is the Administrative Litigation Law (ALL).  Enacted in 1989, the 
ALL was meant to serve as a key vehicle for allowing citizens to play a role in limiting abuse 
of power by local officials.  Yet a range of factors contributed to the effective neutering of 
the ALL, and it is largely seen by Chinese scholars as having failed in its initial ambition to 
serve as a meaningful constraint on local governments.  Some scholars have argued in fact 
that the key goal of the ALL is not to make local governments accountable to the people they 
serve, but rather to make local governments more accountable to the center.  See Xin He, 
Administrative Law as a Mechanism for Political Control in Contemporary China, in 
BUILDING CONSTITUTIONALISM IN CHINA 144-45 (Stephanie Balme & Michael W. Dowdle, 
eds., 2009).    
58  DAVID SHAMBAUGH, CHINA’S COMMUNIST PARTY: ATROPHY AND ADAPTATION 
(2008).  
59 Id. at 67.  
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government functions, and “negating democratic socialism.”60   Real 
constitutional reform would invoke all of these concerns, so much so 
that, as outlined below, Leftist attacks on proponents of constitutional 
reform in mid-2013 would recite very similar charges against their 
adversaries.  This suggests that the Party has not forgotten what it 
perceives as the lessons of the Soviet experience. 
Shambaugh’s study shows that, whatever congruence there 
may be between specific reforms and a comprehensive constitutional 
reform agenda, the end goal of the CCP in enacting those specific 
reforms differs fundamentally from the reformist goal of a true 
constitutional system in which power is institutionally constrained.61  
Shambaugh’s study strongly suggests that the Party believes a 
genuine embrace of constitutionalism, rather than reinforcing its own 
position, might well lead to the collapse of the one-party system 
altogether, just as similar reforms did in the Soviet Union.  
 
B. Constitutional Rhetoric or Constitutional Reform? 
 
Without doubt, it can be tempting to see various specific 
instances of liberal reform as part of a larger picture of long-term 
constitutional development. In my own prior writing on Chinese 
constitutionalism, I have analyzed attempts by would-be reformers to 
“judicialize” the Chinese Constitution, and in so doing to make state 
action subject to at least a limited form of judicial review.62  I have 
also analyzed cases of judicial innovation by Chinese judges who, 
contrary to the general understanding of their quasi-constitutional 
role, have applied constitutional norms to specific cases.  These 
actions, in essence, have created additional legal requirements for 
                                                                                                               
60 Id. at 68–70.  
61 Id. at 3 (“the CCP has zero interest in transitioning to a Western, or even an Asian, 
democratic system of competitive parties”).  Though Shambaugh does not specifically 
address constitutional reforms, his study generally makes clear that far-reaching liberal 
reforms that would limit Party authority have been rejected.  Constitutionalism would 
certainly be in this category.  
62 Thomas E. Kellogg, Constitutionalism with Chinese Characteristics? Constitutional 
Development and Civil Litigation in China, 7 INT’L J. CONST. L. 215 (2009).  In particular, I 
argued that growing public rights consciousness generated in part by constitutional litigation 
might force the Party-state’s hand: “If more and more Chinese citizens begin to see 
constitutional rights as both relevant to their own lives and legally enforceable, then the 
government may face growing public pressure to respond with more far-reaching reforms.”  
Id. at 245-46.  
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certain litigants not found in Chinese laws and regulations.63  I have 
argued that Chinese courts should be given more space to engage in 
more such innovation, and that their actions might serve as a key 
element in a renewed push by the Party-state to the build a rule of law 
system.64  
Though these articles are—I hope—still relevant 
contributions to the study of Chinese law, they did not, at least as of 
this writing, serve as a predictor of the developmental path of the 
Chinese Constitution.  In the end, the Party-state chose not to follow 
up on the openings highlighted by the cases I described.  Indeed, in 
one instance, the Supreme People’s Court formally annulled the 2001 
Qi Yuling case, which remains the only attempt at full-fledged top-
down constitutional reform.65  The failure to build on these successes 
speaks to the Party’s reluctance to cross the Rubicon of constitutional 
development, and develop a mechanism by which the Party-state is 
genuinely circumscribed in its exercise of political power.  Until that 
Rubicon has been crossed, it will be hard to argue that the Chinese 
Constitution is a truly meaningful legal document.   
Similarly, many analysts have focused on various incidents in 
which constitutional arguments have played a role to argue that the 
Chinese Constitution has in fact become operationalized.  Ginsburg 
and Lin, for example, highlight various cases in which the officials 
have made reference to the constitution in order to resolve various 
legislative disputes.  For them, these cases show that the Chinese 
Constitution “plays an increasingly important role within the party-
state.”66  In their view, “China’s top legislature has routinely engaged 
in interpreting the Constitution during the legislative process, and has 
already accumulated a rich body of constitutional norms.”67  
It is true that, in the various examples they cite, the 
Constitution seems to have played some role.  That said, most of the 
cases that they cite are of relatively limited significance from a 
constitutional development perspective, in the sense that they do not 
limit state power or create a new interpretative norm that must be 
                                                                                                               
63 Thomas E. Kellogg, “Courageous Explorers”? Education Litigation and Judicial 
Innovation in China, 20 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 141 (2007). 
64 Id. at 187–88.  
65 Thomas E. Kellogg, The Death of Constitutional Litigation in China?, 9 JAMESTOWN 
CHINA BRIEF, no. 7, at 4, 2009, https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/04/cb_
009_7_02.pdf.  
66 Yan Lin & Tom Ginsburg, Constitutional Interpretation in Lawmaking: China's 
Invisible Constitutional Enforcement Mechanism, 63 AM. J. COMP. L. 467, 467 (2015).  
67 Id. at 469.  
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followed in future.  In general, in the various cases that Ginsburg and 
Lin describe, state authorities use the Constitution to justify state 
action; they fail to uncover a case in which the legislature reluctantly 
concluded that an action it wanted to take was constitutionally 
prohibited.  
Ginsburg and Lin also fail to grapple with the (much more 
numerous) cases in which the NPC fails to grapple with constitutional 
questions raised during the legislative process.  In 2014, for example, 
the NPC Standing Committee passed a Counter-Espionage Law.  
That law, which replaced the 1993 National Security Law, allowed 
for the seizure of various assets being used for espionage by Chinese 
or international organizations. 68   Such provisions would seem to 
implicate several constitutional rights protections, including the right 
to be protected against unlawful search,69 and the right to privacy of 
personal communications.70  
Though the law did state that “counterespionage work must 
be carried out in accordance with the law and respect and protect 
human rights, as well as protect the legal rights of civil society 
organizations,”71 nonetheless no prophylactic protections were put 
into place to ensure that the Law would not be misused by state 
authorities to conduct surveillance against or seize the assets of civil 
society organizations engaged in various forms of advocacy work.  
Indeed, as far as is known, constitutional values failed to influence 
the legislative drafting process in any way.  
Perhaps most importantly, Ginsburg and Lin overstate the 
legal value of constitutional arguments raised during the legislative 
process.  In fact, such arguments, regardless of their strength, are not 
binding on future legislative action.72  For example, Ginsburg and Lin 
discuss various cases in which the NPC and the National People’s 
Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC) have been called upon to 
clarify the meaning of constitutional provisions relating to public 
                                                                                                               
68 Didi Kristen Tatlow, China Approves Security Law Emphasizing Counterespionage, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/03/world/asia/china-approves-
security-law-emphasizing-counterespionage.html.  
69 XIANFA art. 39 (China) (1982).  
70 XIANFA art. 40 (China) (1982).  
71 China passes Counterespionage Law for Comprehensive State Security, XINHUA 
(Nov. 1, 2014), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-11/01/c_133759158.htm.  
72 Ginsburg and Lin also do not address the question of failure to implement laws, and 
the lack of a constitutional mechanism to address failed implementation by local or 
provincial governments.  
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2018
360 U. PA. ASIAN L. REV.                         [Vol. 11 
 
ownership of natural resources and land, a key issue in China in 
recent years.73  As Ginsburg and Lin themselves point out, in drafting 
laws that give meaning to these constitutional provisions, the NPC 
and the Standing Committee have taken a largely ad hoc, “case-by-
case” approach, and have even given “strikingly different answers” 
in response to different laws as to the meaning of public ownership 
of different resources.74  No jurisprudence was developed by the NPC 
and the NPCSC during the law-drafting process, and even the legal 
norms that were codified in laws were not applicable to future laws.  
In essence, constitutional arguments put forward during the 
legislative process are more rhetorical and political in nature than 
they are legal or constitutional.  In practice, if the Party decided that 
it wanted to reverse recent property law reforms to reclassify the 
ownership of various natural resources, or to strengthen the 
ownership rights of the state versus private property rights holders, it 
would face few legal barriers in doing so.  Such action may well be 
politically unlikely, but it is by no means legally or constitutionally 
impermissible.  
Without doubt, Ginsburg and Lin’s examination of the 
rhetorical role of the Chinese Constitution in the legislative process 
contributes to a fuller understanding of how laws are made in China.  
It is also undoubtedly a positive sign that constitutional arguments 
carry some rhetorical weight in certain NPC deliberations.  But it 
seems like an overstatement to suggest that the cases they examine 
demonstrate that the NPC and the NPCSC “have been fairly active in 
illuminating constitutional meanings in China”75 or to suggest that 
the legislative process has become “a major venue for constitutional 
evolution.”76  
 
C. Popular Constitutionalism Chinese Style? The Limits of 
Bottom-Up Reforms 
 
The lack of state-led constitutional activity has led a number 
of both Chinese and Western scholars to shift their attention to 
Chinese society itself as the likely key force for constitutional 
development.  Indeed, bottom-up reforms have achieved more than 
                                                                                                               
73 XIANFA art. 9–10 (China) (1982).  
74 Lin & Ginsburg, supra note 66, at 14.  
75 Id. at 16.  
76 Id. at 18.  
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top-down efforts over the past several years.  For the foreseeable 
future, such efforts—often labeled as Chinese examples of “popular 
constitutionalism”77 —represent the best hope for new reforms.78  
That said, however, labeling those reforms that have been 
achieved through social mobilization efforts as moments of meaning 
constitutional development is problematic.  Given that virtually all of 
the reforms that have been achieved by citizen activism are limited in 
their broader impact, and are, at the end of the day, not binding on 
future Party or state action, the constitutional moniker may not fit.  
Take, for example, the 2003 Sun Zhigang case.  In April 2003, 
the tragic death of a young student named Sun Zhigang in detention 
stirred nationwide outrage.79  Sun had been detained under the so-
called Custody and Repatriation regulations, which allowed local 
officials to detain individuals found residing in places other than their 
official place of residence as designated on their household 
registration, or hukou.80  
After Sun’s death, apparently at the hands of local detention 
center officials, made newspaper headlines nationwide, three young 
scholars in Beijing—Teng Biao, Xu Zhiyong, and Yu Jiang—
submitted a constitutional review proposal to the NPCSC, which is 
formally empowered to interpret the Chinese Constitution.  They 
argued that the Custody and Repatriation regulations were both 
illegal and unconstitutional, in that they violated the Constitution, the 
Legislation Law, and the Administrative Punishment Law.81  
Within weeks of the scholarly petition, the State Council 
announced that it was scrapping the regulations, replacing them with 
                                                                                                               
77 LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 7 (2004).  Kramer argues that, in the early years after its inception in 1789, 
the American constitutional republic featured an active and dynamic role for the American 
people in constitutional development.  It was they, Kramer argues, and not merely the courts, 
the Congress, or the executive, who “were responsible for seeing that [the Constitution] was 
properly interpreted and implemented.  The idea of turning this responsibility over to judges 
was simply unthinkable.”  
78 Thomas E. Kellogg, Western Funding for Rule of Law Initiatives in China: the 
Importance of a Civil Society-Based Approach, CHINESE PERSPECTIVES, no. 3, 2012, at 53, 
https://chinaperspectives.revues.org/5954.  
79 For an excellent account of the Sun Zhigang case and its aftermath, see Keith J. Hand, 
Using Law for a Righteous Purpose: The Sun Zhigang Incident and Evolving Forms of 
Citizen Action in the People’s Republic of China, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 114 (2006).  
80 Id. at 120. 
81 Id. at 124.  
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voluntary measures to aid migrants. 82   The State Council 
announcement was rightly hailed as an important victory for Chinese 
constitutionalism, and has since been seen as a key milestone in 
China’s constitutional development.  
It was indeed an important victory, but was it a developmental 
milestone? It is true that, as a result of public pressure largely framed 
in constitutional language, the Chinese government scrapped a 
pernicious form of arbitrary detention that, facially speaking, would 
seem to violate Chinese constitutional rights provisions.  But for all 
of its success, the Sun Zhigang case did not change the meaning of 
the Chinese Constitution: it did not, for example, create a 
constitutional norm prohibiting arbitrary detention. Though Custody 
and Repatriation was scrapped, a number of other forms of arbitrary 
detention remained on the books, some of which remain in effect to 
this day.83  In addition, the constitutional petition issued by Xu, Teng, 
and Yu did not create a new process for petitioning for constitutional 
change: the NPCSC has failed to take any formal constitutional action 
on all subsequent constitutional petitions addressed to it.  
Even in Sun’s case, the Party-state took great pains to deny 
the constitutional implications of its own actions.  In a historic first, 
the NPCSC did formally accept the constitutional review petition 
authored by the three scholars. 84   However, rather than publicly 
responding to the constitutional petition or stating that it was issuing 
an interpretation of the Chinese Constitution, the State Council 
merely voided the regulations without any constitutional explication 
or explanation whatsoever.  While it is true that the Party did initially 
allow extensive public discussion of the case online and in the 
Chinese media, 85  it likely did so in order to bolster its own 
constitutional credentials at a time when its public credibility had 
been damaged, rather than as a signal of any willingness to accept 
additional reforms.86  The Party’s decision to act through the State 
                                                                                                               
82 Id. at 128. 
83 CHANGING THE SOUP BUT NOT THE MEDICINE: ABOLISHING RE-EDUCATION THROUGH 
LABOR IN CHINA, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL (2013), https://www.amnesty.org/en/
documents/asa17/042/2013/en.  See also “AN ALLEYWAY IN HELL”: CHINA’S ABUSIVE 
“BLACK JAILS,” HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (2009).  
84 Hand, supra note 79, at 149. 
85 Keith Hand, Resolving Constitutional Disputes in Contemporary China, 7 U. PA. E. 
ASIA L. REV. 51 (2012). 
86 The government also enacted some minor improvements to the NPCSC’s legislative 
review process, in particular by creating a new office to review and resolve legislative 
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Council rather than the NPCSC also meant that no formal 
constitutional precedent was set. This meant that the Party-state 
remained free of formal constitutional constraints on its authority.  
A better understanding of the Sun Zhigang case might be 
arrived a through a study of the underlying political dynamics, rather 
than through an emphasis on its legal-constitutional dimensions.  In 
essence, the Sun Zhigang case was a significant political victory, 
which showed, more or less for the first time, that the Party could be 
forced to bow to political pressure to enact progressive reforms, 
assuming that pressure was sufficiently strong and sustained.  
From the Party's perspective, an excessive emphasis on the 
legal-constitutional elements of the Sun Zhigang case and other such 
cases might obscure what is actually happening. At times the Party is 
forced to compromise, but it always preserves its monopoly on 
political power and its ability to exercise that power without any 
institutional constraints.  While it is true that such forms of 
negotiation and compromise are an important development, 
nonetheless they are just that: forms of political contestation and 
negotiation, which, sadly, are all too rare87  and have virtually no 
permanent institutional impact.  Perhaps the best that one can say 
about the constitutional implications of cases like the Sun Zhigang 
tragedy is that they constitute important victories for constitutionally 
enumerated values. Nonetheless, they have not brought China any 
closer to actual constitutional enforcement.  Therefore framing them 
as part a process of ongoing constitutional development—rather than 
as discrete and often important victories for liberal reformers—may 
not make sense.   
This is not to say that efforts by academics, lawyers, and 
activists are not deeply important—of course they are.  Such efforts 
have been especially successful in terms of educating the public on 
how constitutions should work to limit state power and protect 
individual rights.  But there are limits to what such approaches can 
                                                                                                               
conflicts.  Hand, supra note 79, at 152.  Over the first decade of its existence, however, that 
office, known as the Bei’an Shi, has failed to play a meaningful role, either in resolving legal 
conflicts, or in constitutional development more generally.  Chinese constitutional scholar 
Guobin Zhu, for example, concludes that “the symbolic significance of the (Bei’an Shi) 
reaches farther than the actual significance.”  Guobin Zhu, Constitutional Review in China: 
An Unaccomplished Project or a Mirage?, 43 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 625 (2010).   
87  Qianfan Zhang, A Constitution Without Constitutionalism? The Paths of 
Constitutional Development in China, 8 INT’L J. CONST. L. 950, 968–76 (2010).  
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accomplish, first and foremost because they are not easily 
reproducible.88  Given that only extreme miscarriages of justice—
most likely including death—are enough to capture public attention, 
the model, such as it is, comes with a high human cost.  
Overall, China’s experience over the last decade or more 
speaks more to the limits of bottom-up constitutional development 
strategies within an authoritarian system than it does to the potential 
of such strategies to produce fundamental systemic change.  From a 
ruler’s perspective, China’s experience indicates that authoritarian 
governments have to carefully balance the legitimacy-enhancing 
benefits of legal reform with the concern that such reforms could, if 
taken too far, eventually limit the authoritarian ruler’s power and 
undercut the ruler’s political legitimacy. 89   Such a balancing act 
requires constant vigilance, and, when necessary, repressive 
retrenchment, to pull back—or if need be, forcibly retire—those 
scholars, lawyers, and activists who would push reforms farther than 
the Party is willing to see them go.90  
 
III. THE DEBATE BEGINS: DECEMBER 2012–MAY 2013 
 
The first stage of the debate ran from December 2012 to May 
2013, and was, in essence, a conversation between two groups: the 
Liberals and the Socialist Constitutionalists.  While both Liberals and 
Socialist Constitutionalists agreed on the need for constitutional 
reform, and even largely agreed on several of the key elements of 
constitutional reform—including a constitutional review mechanism, 
                                                                                                               
88 Id. at 968–972 (“[r]ather than improving the institutional capacity of the regime to 
prevent abuses of power, the Sun Zhigang model, in essence, provides only a trigger for 
initiating a remedial process.  The process itself is not only too late, in view of the occurrence 
of the tragedy and the inability to prevent conflict, but is seriously limited, as well, in its 
capacity to correct the wrongs produced by an anachronistic institutional arrangement 
naturally prone to corruption and abuses of power.”).   
89 See Fu Hualing et al., Challenging Authoritarianism Through Law: Potentials and 
Limit, 6 NAT’L TAIWAN U. L. REV. 339, 358 (2011) (“there are inequality and injustice [in 
China] and people who have suffered are entitled to legal remedies.  But a legal mobilization, 
as rights lawyers have envisaged and are practicing, is too interruptive to political stability 
that is essential for the survival of the Party/state.  Injustice as prevalent as it is, can only be 
brought to solution at a pace and according to a method with which the CCP is comfortable.  
Lawyers cannot be the representative of the interest of the people.  Only the Party can.”).  
90 One such moment of retrenchment took place in July 2015, when the Party-State 
detained or harassed close to three hundred lawyers and activists, in one of the largest attacks 
on civil society in China in recent memory.  See Andrew Jacobs & Chris Buckley, China 
Targeting Rights Lawyers in a Crackdown, N.Y. TIMES (July 22, 2015), http://www.nytimes.
com/2015/07/23/world/asia/china-crackdown-human-rights-lawyers.html.  
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enhanced basic rights protections, and greater institutional 
independence for each of the three branches of government—they 
disagreed on how advance the cause of reform.  Most Socialists, 
articulating the mainstream academic view, argued in favor of 
working through the existing system and sought areas of compromise, 
or, even better, agreement with the CCP.  Liberals, on the other hand, 
expressed skepticism over the willingness of the Party to embrace any 
meaningful constitutional reforms, and therefore questioned theories 
of change that put the Party, rather than bottom-up social pressure for 
reform, at the forefront.  
The debate over constitutionalism began on December 4, 
2012, with a speech by Xi Jinping on the 30th anniversary of the 1982 
anniversary of the Constitution. Speaking to a large audience in the 
Great Hall of the People, Party Secretary Xi extolled the supremacy 
of China’s constitution and called for greater attention to 
constitutional implementation.91  
Notably, Xi highlighted the basic rights provisions of the 
1982 Constitution, and called for protection of the people’s “personal 
rights, private property rights, and other political rights according to 
the law.” 92   Xi even obliquely suggested a need for institutional 
change, a long-sought goal of reform-minded academics. Xi said 
“[w]e must establish mechanisms to restrain and supervise power . . . 
power must be responsible and must be supervised.”93  
At first glance, such remarks might seem to herald an 
important shift: for decades, even as the Party has embraced legal 
reform, it has shied away from the creation of institutional 
mechanisms that would both restrain its free hand in the exercise of 
political power, and also better protect citizens’ rights against state 
intrusion.  
                                                                                                               
91 Xi Jinping Pledges to Implement Rule of Law, CHINA DAILY (Dec. 5, 2012), http://
www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2012-12/05/content_15985873.htm (quoting Xi Jinping, “To 
fully implement the Constitution needs to be the sole task and the basic work in building a 
socialist nation ruled by law”).  
92 Xi Jinping (习近平), Zai Shoudu Gejie Jinian Xianxing Xianfa Gongbu Shishi 30 
Zhounian Dahui Shang de Jianghua (在首都各界纪念现行宪法公布施行３０周年大会
上的讲话) [Speech in the Capital Commemorating the 30th Anniversary of the Promulgation 
and Implementation of the 1982 Constitution (Dec. 4, 2012), http://news.xinhuanet.com/
politics/2012-12/04/c_113907206.htm, translation at http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/
2013/05/xi-jingpings-constitutional-vision.html.  
93 Id.  
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And yet, given the Party’s history of appropriating the 
language of law, constitutionalism, and rights for its own purposes, 
many observers did not take Xi’s December 4 speech at face value.  
In fact, Xi’s predecessor, Hu Jintao, made a similar speech soon after 
he took office, celebrating the 20th anniversary of the 1982 
Constitution.  In that speech, Hu praised the constitution as the 
“fundamental guideline” for using state power and, like Xi, called 
attention to the constitution’s protection of basic rights.  Hu also made 
reference to the still-imperfect implementation of the Constitution, 
and also hinted at the need for an improved “[c]onstitutional 
supervision mechanism.”94  Hu’s pro-reform rhetoric had little effect 
on his substantive agenda.  When he stepped down in 2012, Hu had 
undertaken no meaningful constitutional reforms.  In general, Hu’s 
ten-year tenure was criticized by many for the lack of progress on 
legal reform.95  
Despite this history, many observers within China took 
advantage of the opportunity afforded both by Xi’s remarks to put 
forward pro-constitutional reform arguments.  Many reformers also 
wanted to take advantage of the fact that, less than a year into Xi’s 
tenure as China’s supreme leader, his views on reform were at that 
time largely unknown, and the political direction for the coming year 
was still uncertain. 96   Though Xi inherited a temporal challenge 
created by thirty years of Party inaction on constitutional 
                                                                                                               
94  Hu Jintao ( 胡锦涛 ), Hu Jintao Zai Shoudu Gejie Jinian Zhonghua Renmin 
Gongheguo Xianfa Gongbu Shishi Ershi Zhounian Dahui Shang de Jianghua (胡锦涛在首
都各界纪念中华人民共和国宪法公布施行二十周年大会上的讲话) [Hu Jintao’s Speech 
in the Capital in the Great Hall of the People on the 20th Anniversary of the Promulgation 
and Implementation of the 1982 Constitution], XINHUA (Dec. 4, 2002), http://news.xinhuanet.
com/newscenter/2002-12/04/content_649591.htm, translated at http://www.humanrights.
cn/zt/magazine/200402004823153254.htm.  
95 Ian Johnson & Keith Bradsher, On Way Out, China’s Leader Offers Praise for the 
Status Quo, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/09/world/asia/hu-
jintao-exiting-communist-leader-cautions-china.html.  See also Shi Jiangtao, President Hu 
Jintao’s Legacy Seen as One of Stability but Stagnation, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Sept. 7, 
2012), http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1031120/president-hu-jintaos-legacy-seen
-one-stability-stagnation.  
96  Chen Hongguo (谌洪果), Zhongguo Dangxia de Xianzheng Sichao: Mubiao Ji 
Lujing Zhizheng (中国当下的宪政思潮: 目标及路径之争) [Recent National Trends in 
Constitutionalist Thought: Debate over Goals and Paths,] CHEN HONGGUO DE GONGSHI 
WANG: SIXIANGZHE DE BOKE (谌洪果的共识网: 思想者博客 ) [CHEN HONGGUO’S 
CONSENSUS NET: A THINKER’S BLOG] (June 20, 2013), http://chenhongguo.blog.21ccom.
net/?p=87.  
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development, the legitimacy gap was narrowed by the newness of 
Xi’s administration.  
Xi’s strong anti-corruption rhetoric, which stems from his 
first days as Party Secretary,97 also gave liberals hope that Xi was in 
fact serious about political reform.  On at least one occasion, Xi 
publicly linked his own anti-corruption efforts to institutional reforms, 
stating that “power must be restricted by the cage of regulations.”98  
As with the pro-constitutional rhetoric of his December 4 speech, this 
comment would also be repeatedly echoed by would-be 
constitutional reformists as evidence that Xi himself—and, by 
extension, the Party—was on their side.99  
Xi’s December 4 speech was a classic—and, by this point, 
almost ritualized—example of the Party’s efforts to use the 
Constitution to enhance its legitimacy. With his suggestion that China 
“must establish mechanisms to restrain and supervise power,”100 Xi 
suggested that he was contemplating institutional reforms that would 
fundamentally change the political system in China.  In so doing, he 
was using the Constitution as a false blueprint, signaling—falsely, if 
the time that has passed since the speech is any guide—that he 
planned to move forward with institutional reforms that would 
operationalize the Chinese Constitution and turn it into a formal legal 
document.  
One of the first responses to Xi’s speech came from one of 
China’s leading media outlets, Caixin. In an unsigned editorial 
                                                                                                               
97  Andrew Hall Wedeman, Xi Jinping’s Anti-Corruption Campaign and the Third 
Plenum, UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM CHINA POLICY INSTITUTE BLOG (Nov. 15, 2013), 
http://blogs.nottingham.ac.uk/chinapolicyinstitute/2013/11/15/xi-jinpings-anti-corruption-
campaign-and-the-third-plenum/ (noting that, Xi’s rhetoric to the contrary, his first year in 
office did not yield a significant increase in charges being filed against allegedly corrupt 
officials).  
98 Xi Jinping Vows “Power Within Cage of Regulations,” XINHUA (Jan. 22, 2013), 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-01/22/c_132120363.htm.  Xi was addressing 
the Party’s Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), the Party’s leading anti-
corruption unit.   In that same speech, Xi went on to say, “Party cadres at various levels 
should keep in mind that no one can enjoy absolute power outside the law.”  To date, 
however, no institutional reforms have been implemented as part of Xi’s anti-corruption 
drive.  
99  Among many examples, see Weng Yicai (翁一采 ), Cai Xia: Quanli Ru Long 
Guanche Zai Zhizheng Dang Wancheng Lishi Zhuanxing (蔡霞: 权力入笼关键在执政党
完成历史转型) [Cai Xia: The Key to Putting Power in a Cage is the Completion of the 
Historic Transition of the Governing Party], SHIDAI ZHOUBAO (时代周报) [TIMES WEEKLY] 
(Jan. 31, 2013), http://time-weekly.com/story/2013-01-31/128867.html. 
100 Xi, supra note 92.  
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published roughly a week after Xi’s remarks, Caixin praised Xi’s 
calls for greater attention to constitutional implementation. Caixin 
particularly emphasized institutional reforms, including longstanding 
proposals for a new Constitutional Court or a constitutional review 
committee under the NPC, noting that “[t]he constitution gains its 
authority in practice.”101  
Foreshadowing controversies to come, Caixin made reference 
to Xi’s “Chinese Dream” rhetoric of earlier in 2012, saying that 
constitutional development was “also part of the dream.”102  
Later that month, another pro-constitutional reform salvo was 
fired, one which also made reference to Xi’s December 4 speech.  On 
December 26, a group of seventy-two prominent scholars, most of 
them in the Liberal camp, published a Reform Consensus Proposal 
(gaige gongshi changyishu).  Signed by leading scholars, including 
Beijing University professors Zhang Qianfan and He Weifang, 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) scholar Xu Youyu, and 
former President of Chinese University of Political Science and Law 
Jiang Ping, the Proposal grew out of a meeting held jointly by the 
Beijing University Law School Constitutional and Administrative 
Law Research Center and the reformist magazine Yanhuang Chunqiu 
in late November.103  The document advocated a six point reform 
agenda, including constitutional governance, implementation of 
electoral democracy, respect for free expression, deepening of market 
reforms, realization of judicial independence, and safeguarding of 
constitutional effectiveness, including through the creation and 
implementation of an effective constitutional review mechanism.  
The Proposal was representative of much of the constitutional 
reform debate that would follow in 2013 in four key ways.  First, it 
linked the need for constitutional reform to serious shortcomings in 
                                                                                                               
101 For China to Rise, so Must Status of Its Constitution, CAIXIN ONLINE (Dec. 12, 2012), 
http://english.caixin.com/2012-12-12/100471777.html.  
102 See also Interview with Zhiwei Tong, constitutional scholar.  Xu Wei (徐伟), Tong 
Zhiwei: “Yixian Zhizheng” Jiu Yao Quanmian Luoshi Xianfa (童之伟:“依宪执政”就要
全面落实宪法) [Tong Zhiwei: “Constitutional Governance” Requires Full Implementation 
of the Constitution], SHIDAI ZHOUBAO (时代周报 ) [TIMES WEEKLY] (Dec. 13, 2012), 
http://time-weekly.com/story/2012-12-13/128260.html.  Tong suggests that, in essence, Xi’s 
remarks show that the new CCP leadership favors constitutional reform.  
103  Lin Lan (林兰 ), Zhongguo 70 Duo Zhiming Xuezhe Lianming Tuichu Gaige 
Gongshi Changyi Shu (中国 70 多位知名学者联名推出《改革共识倡议书》) [More 
Than Seventy Noted Chinese Scholars Jointly Release “Reform Consensus Proposal”], 
RADIO FRANCE INTERNATIONALE (Dec. 26, 2012).  The RFI report includes the full text of 
the Reform Proposal, which was subsequently blocked on websites inside China.  
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China’s current governance structure, and painted a picture of abuse 
of power, corruption, and lack of transparency that could only be 
addressed through far-reaching and fundamental institutional 
reforms.104  The Proposal eschewed academic jargon and theoretical 
abstractions to focus on a vision for China’s future reform path that 
could be appreciated by both scholars and by a broader general 
audience.  
Second, the Proposal pointed to the urgency of reform, 
suggesting that time was in fact not on the new leadership’s side. “If 
the systemic reform that Chinese society so urgently needs is again 
thwarted, then stagnation, official corruption, and social discontent 
will lead China to the verge of crisis,” the Proposal warns.  “China 
will once again lose an opportunity for peaceful reform, and sink into 
the turbulence and chaos of violent revolution.”105  
Third, the Proposal, though aimed at the new leadership under 
Xi Jinping, highlighted the importance of broad public consensus, 
and the role of the Chinese people in pushing for bottom-up reform.  
“Without reformist pressure from outside the system, those inside the 
system will lack a motive drive for reform,” the Proposal argues.  
The fourth way in which the Proposal was representative of 
the reformist proposals that would follow in 2013 was that it indicated 
a high degree of consensus among academics and intellectuals in 
favor of reform.  Though the debate between the Socialist 
Constitutionalists and the Liberals, described in more detail below, 
highlighted a number of areas of disagreement, nonetheless, there 
was broad agreement on the need for truly meaningful constitutional 
reform. 
Other pro-Constitutional reform statements followed, many 
of which also made use of both Xi’s December 4 speech and his 
“Chinese dream” rhetoric.  In early January 2013, the pro-reform 
magazine Yanhuang Chunqiu issued a New Year’s Greeting entitled 
“The Constitution is a Consensus for Political System Reform.”106  In 
                                                                                                               
104 Id. (stating that the Proposal notes that the failure to make progress on political 
reform has meant that “official corruption, the misuse of public power, and the growing gap 
between rich and poor, and other such phenomenon have grown more critical with each 
passing day, leading to intense public dissatisfaction”).  
105 Id.  
106 Xianfa Shi Zhengzhi Tizhi Gaige de Gongshi (宪法是政治体制改革的共识), [The 
Constitution is a Consensus for Political System Reform], YANHUANG CHUNQIU (炎黄春秋) 
[ANNALS OF THE YELLOW EMPEROR] (Jan. 2, 2013), translated at http://cmp.hku.hk/
2013/01/02/30203/.  
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2018
370 U. PA. ASIAN L. REV.                         [Vol. 11 
 
it, the magazine’s editors gave various examples of how some of 
China’s most pressing political, legal, and social challenges could be 
addressed by full implementation of specific constitutional provisions.  
Following in the footsteps of the Consensus Reform Proposal, 
Yanhuang Chunqiu called for institutional reforms, citing prior 
reform proposals calling for the creation of a constitutional review 
system or a constitutional court.  Within days of the op-ed’s 
publication, Yanhuang Chunqiu’s website was shut down, though it 
would later be allowed to reopen.107 
The drafters of the Reform Consensus Proposal and of the 
media pieces that followed were determined to make immediate use 
Xi’s December 4 speech to push for constitutional reform.  In 
particular, the Proposal was a paradigmatic example of the ways in 
which the regime’s own constitutionalist rhetoric can be used to push 
a liberal, reformist, anti-authoritarian line.  With its warning of 
impending crisis and calls for a bottom-up push for constitutionalism, 
the Proposal avoided the trap of reinforcing the Party’s 
constitutionalist credentials, and instead kept its focus on the need for 
action.  Such a push-and-pull between the Party and reformist 
intellectuals, with constitutionalism as the key vehicle, would 
become a key element of domestic political debate in 2013.  
 
A. The Southern Weekend Controversy 
 
The difficulties that Yanhuang Chunqiu faced over its New 
Year’s editorial paled in comparison to the travails of the longtime 
liberal stalwart newspaper Southern Weekend.  Its editors also penned 
a New Year’s greeting highlighting the need for constitutional reform.  
In fact, the piece was originally titled “Chinese Dream, Dream of 
Constitutional Governance.”  That piece was essentially rewritten by 
provincial Party censors, leading to a standoff between Southern 
Weekend staff and provincial authorities, as well as carnival-like 
protests by members of the public in front of Southern Weekend’s 
Guangzhou offices.108  
                                                                                                               
107 Verna Yu, Yanhuang Chunqiu Website Closed down After Editorial on Constitution, 
S. CHINA MORNING POST (Jan. 5, 2013), http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1120153/
yanhuang-chunqiu-website-closed-down-after-editorial-constitution.  
108 Edward Wong, Protest Grows over Censoring of China Paper, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 
2013), http://m.cn.nytimes.com/china/20130108/c08southern-updated/en-us.  
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The incident began with an extensive back-and-forth between 
rank-and-file Southern Weekend editors and the editor-in-chief 
Huang Can over the content of the paper’s annual New Year’s 
message to readers.109  In years past, the New Year’s message had 
focused on the need for liberal reforms, and the original draft of the 
2013 New Year’s message, penned by editorial writer Dai Zhiyong, 
was no exception.  Working in consultation with provincial 
propaganda officials, editor-in-chief Huang extensively watered 
down Dai’s draft, altering the meaning of the piece considerably, 
while nonetheless keeping a few kernels of liberal reformist 
sentiment.  
Had the watered-down version been published without 
additional changes, the episode would likely have passed unnoticed 
as just another example of routine censorship in the Chinese media.  
But the piece was reworked further.  These further edits were 
attributed to provincial propaganda chief Tuo Zhen, a former 
journalist and longtime propaganda official known for his 
conservative views. 110   This final round of edits fundamentally 
altered the meaning of the piece, scrubbing it entirely of its original 
liberal tone.  In essence, the last round of edits turned the editorial 
into a propaganda piece that praised the Party for its successful 
pursuit of the “Chinese dream” of national greatness.111  This direct 
intervention by propaganda officials was seen by many as a new level 
of censorship, a form of heavy-handedness that crossed the line.  
A side-by-side comparison of the two editorials highlights in 
very dramatic fashion the very different ways in which external and 
internal actors use constitutional concepts to craft very different 
messages, and to pursue very different goals.  
Dai Zhiyong’s original draft, “China’s Dream, the Dream of 
the Constitution,” made an eloquent and relatively moderate plea for 
                                                                                                               
109 For an extensive account of the editorial process from an authoritative source, see 
Qian Gang, “Why Southern Weekly Said ‘No,’” CHINA MEDIA PROJECT (Jan. 11, 2013), 
http://cmp.hku.hk/2013/01/11/30623/.  
110 Id. (suggesting that the final changes were made not by Tuo Zhen, but by his deputy 
Yang Jian.  Moreover, propaganda officials ordered other changes—to pictures, to headlines, 
and to other pieces—in addition to the changes made to the New Year’s editorial).  
111 A number of journalists—some of them ex-Southern Weekend staffers—noticed 
immediately that some lines in the New Year’s Day editorial were borrowed directly from 
official propaganda pieces in outlets like the People’s Daily.  David Bandurski, A New Year’s 
Greeting Gets the Axe in China, CHINA MEDIA PROJECT (Jan. 3, 2013), http://cmp.
hku.hk/2013/01/03/30247/.  
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constitutionalism. 112   Dai makes four key points.  First, he 
appropriates Xi Jinping’s “dream” rhetoric, calling on his readers to 
realize the Chinese “dream of freedom, the dream of 
constitutionalism.”  Second, Dai reframes modern Chinese history as 
a series of—at times catastrophic—failures to realize this dream.  
Third, he places the CCP itself within this historical context, 
implicitly linking the Party to other pre-1949 ruling elites who also 
failed to realize the constitutionalist dream.  In so doing, he suggests 
that contemporary problems are linked to the absence of 
constitutionalism, and can only be solved through constitutional 
development.  
Dai’s final point is perhaps his most subtle one and also 
among the most important.  By framing his piece as written from the 
perspective of, and directly to the Chinese people themselves, Dai 
suggests that responsibility for achieving the “Chinese dream” of 
constitutionalism lies not with the Party, but with the people 
themselves.  The people must “act right now with our own hands” in 
order to achieve it.  
The revised editorial turns Dai’s piece on its head.  Rather 
than refashioning official Chinese dream rhetoric to serve a genuine 
liberal constitutionalist agenda, the revised piece instead embraces 
and trumpets the Party line, quoting Xi Jinping’s call to realize the 
Chinese dream of “the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”  Rather 
than drawing historical parallels with the Qing Dynasty and the 
Republican era, the revised editorial places contemporary China—
and, by extension, the ruling CCP—in the privileged position of 
having come “closer to this dream than we ever were.”  The single 
mention of constitutionalism suggests progress and effectuation, 
rather than any sense of falling short.  
Half as long and, at times, platitudinous and dull, the revised 
editorial fails to engage or inspire.  It reads as tired filler, as 
propaganda, and the basic errors that were written into the speech 
added insult to injury to those Southern Weekend journalists who 
were upset by its appearance in the pages of what once was China’s 
most progressive news media outlet.  The low quality of the piece, 
                                                                                                               
112  The Southern Weekly Affair: No Closer to the Chinese Dream?, FREE SPEECH 
DEBATE (Feb. 20, 2013), http://freespeechdebate.com/en/discuss/the-southern-weekly-
affair-no-closer-to-the-chinese-dream/.  Both the original piece and the final published 
version were translated and published online by the Free Speech Debate project at Oxford 
University.  Unless otherwise noted, all of the quotes from the editorial are taken from this 
translation.  
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and the intense negative reaction it generated, speaks to the very real 
challenge that the Party faces in creating constitutional messages that 
can resonate with the public.  
When the revised editorial hit the newsstands on January 3, 
2013, the reaction was immediate and intensely negative: top 
reporters and editors were shocked over the wholesale reworking of 
the piece, which took place outside of normal editorial channels, and 
deeply dismayed by its propagandistic tone.  When Southern 
Weekend editor Huang Can took steps to have the paper publicly—
and, of course, falsely—assert that the editorial was in fact written by 
Southern Weekend staff, editors and reporters rebelled, and called for 
an investigation of what they saw as unprecedented and unacceptable 
interference.  Some reporters published an open letter calling for Tuo 
Zhen’s resignation.113  Others went on a short-lived strike.  
If the response to the doctored editorial had been limited to 
the paper’s staff, there is no doubt the Party would have considered it 
a regrettable but largely minor incident.  However, news of the 
incident spread quickly across China on the Internet and made waves 
across Chinese society.  Within days of the incident, protestors began 
to congregate outside of Southern Weekend’s Guangzhou office, 
many of them toting signs calling for press freedom and other basic 
rights.114  Interestingly, many of the protestors carried signs calling 
for the implementation of China’s constitution.  For many, the street 
protests were an extremely rare example of a public protest in defense 
of a basic constitutional ideal.  
For millions of average Chinese, the incident played out 
online.  Despite the best efforts of Chinese censors to keep the 
incident out of the mainstream press and off of the Chinese internet, 
an uncountable number of individual Chinese followed the standoff 
closely, avidly reading extensive Chinese-language and English-
                                                                                                               
113 Teddy Ng, Former Southern Weekly Journalists Want Propaganda Chief Tuo Zhen 
to Go, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Jan. 5, 2013), http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/
1120199/former-southern-weekly-journalists-want-propaganda-chief-tuo-zhen-go.  The 
open letter strongly and publicly criticized Tuo Zhen by name, an extremely rare occurrence 
in China.  The journalists referred to Tuo’s actions as “ignorant and excessive,” and also 
called for his resignation.  “In this era where we see growing open-mindedness, his actions 
are muddle-headed and careless,” the journalists wrote.  “Tuo is unable to hold his current 
position, and should be forced to resign and make an open apology.” 
114 Edward Wong, Protest Grows over Censoring of China Paper, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 
2013), http://m.cn.nytimes.com/china/20130108/c08southern-updated/en-us.  One banner 
carried by protesters read, “Get rid of censorship. The Chinese people want freedom.”  
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language international media reports on the incident.  Chinese actress 
Li Bingbing mentioned the incident to her 19 million followers on 
Weibo, the Chinese version of Twitter.  Actress Yao Chen also sent 
an indirect message of support to Southern Weekend to her 31 million 
followers.115  
On January 6, a constellation of more than two dozen of 
China’s top intellectuals, academics, journalists, and lawyers, many 
of whom had written for Southern Weekend during its heyday as 
China’s top intellectual journal, issued an open letter praising 
Southern Weekend for its contributions to reform in China.  They 
echoed the call for Tuo Zhen’s dismissal. 116   Several hundred 
intellectuals signed a second open letter calling for stronger legal 
protection of free expression.  Others, including the journalism 
faculty at Nanjing University117 and students at Guangzhou’s Sun 
Yat-sen University, 118  also spoke out in support of Southern 
Weekend’s rank-and-file journalists and editors.  Overall, public 
interest in the controversy was very strong.  
With cultural figures, prominent public intellectuals, 
journalists, and even some more mainstream academics all lining up 
on the side of Southern Weekend—and, at least in some way, in favor 
of constitutionalism—it seemed clear that the Party propaganda 
apparatus was losing the war of words, and that its loss was damaging 
the Party’s credibility.  Provincial officials moved quickly to 
negotiate an end to the standoff, which, in essence, guaranteed a 
return to “normal” standards of oversight and censorship.  Public 
                                                                                                               
115 Id. 
116 For a partial translation of the open letter, see David Bandurski, Inside the Southern 
Weekly Incident, CHINA MEDIA PROJECT (Jan. 7, 2013), http://cmp.hku.hk/2013/01/07/
30402/.  
117 Teddy Ng, Former Southern Weekly Journalists Want Propaganda Chief Tuo Zhen 
to Go, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Jan. 5, 2013), http://www.scmp.com/news/china/
article/1120199/former-southern-weekly-journalists-want-propaganda-chief-tuo-zhen-go.  
118 Ian Johnson, Test for New Leaders as Chinese Paper Takes on Censors, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 6, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/07/world/asia/chinese-newspaper-
challenges-the-censors.html.  In their open letter, the students linked the struggle at Southern 
Weekend to the lack of legal status of the Chinese Constitution:  
It is because we have yielded that power has become unbridled and 
wanton; it is because we have been silent that the Constitution has 
become a rubber stamp. Our yielding and our silence has not brought 
a return of our freedom and our radiance. Quite the opposite, it has 
brought the untempered intrusion and infiltration of rights by power. 
David Bandurski, Students Speak out Against Censorship, CHINA MEDIA PROJECT (Jan. 6, 
2013), http://cmp.hku.hk/2013/01/06/30375/.  
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protests in front of the Southern Weekend office died down, and the 
public moved on to other issues.  
To be sure, a key element of the Southern Weekend 
controversy was the way in which it demonstrated to Party leaders 
the growing tension between rank-and-file journalists and the 
massive Party-run censorship system. 119   Tensions between 
journalists and their managers had been growing for years, as Party 
propaganda officials moved to plug loopholes in the media 
management apparatus. 120   In particular, officials looked to 
strengthen pre-publication censorship and ensure that journalists 
could not beat the system and run stories that ran counter to Party 
interests.  This in turn further alienated journalists, who resented 
having more and more stories altered or even killed.121  The tensions 
were especially high at Southern Weekend, as the Party moved 
conservative officials into key Party posts both at Southern 
Weekend’s parent, the Nanfang Daily Group, and at the Guangdong 
Province propaganda department, which oversees the paper.122   
From a constitutionalist perspective, the incident 
demonstrated how evocative constitutional rhetoric can be and how 
quickly it can spread from elite circles to the general public.  Public 
attention can, in turn, lead to public protests, long an anathema for 
the Party.  The controversy illustrated the importance of Party control 
over the debate on constitutionalism: failure to maintain control could 
subvert Party efforts to publicly position itself as a pro-
constitutionalist, reformist actor.  In essence, the effect of the 
Southern Weekend incident was the exact opposite of what the Party 
usually attempts to achieve through constitutional-themed public 
messages: instead of bolstering the Party’s legitimacy through the 
trumpeting of the constitution as a false blueprint, the Southern 
Weekend episode damaged the Party’s reputation by exposing its 
                                                                                                               
119  Qian Gang, Why Southern Weekly?, CHINA MEDIA PROJECT (Feb. 18, 2013), 
http://cmp.hku.hk/2013/02/18/31257/.  
120 For an excellent account of the long-term trends that led to the Southern Weekend 
controversy, see David Bandurski, How the Southern Weekly Protests Moved the Bar on 
Press Control, 13 JAMESTOWN CHINA BRIEF, no. 3, at 6, 2013, https://jamestown.
org/program/how-the-southern-weekly-protests-moved-the-bar-on-press-control/.  
121 Id. 
122 Interestingly, Guangdong’s new propaganda chief, Tuo Zhen, was himself once a 
respected up-and-coming journalist.  See Teddy Ng, Tuo Zhen, Crusading Journalist Turned 
Guangdong Propagandist, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Jan. 5, 2013), http://www.scmp.com/
news/china/article/1120156/tuo-zhen-crusading-journalist-turned-guangdong-propagandist.  
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censorship apparatus to public view and ridicule.  The incident also 
placed the Party in the position of publicly subverting, rather than 
upholding, constitutional values. 
The controversy convinced the newly-installed Party 
leadership that it needed to take a firmer line on public debate, and 
reassert greater Party oversight and control over the “ideological 
sphere.”123   
A central element of this reassertion of control was the 
issuance by the Party’s Central Committee General Office of the so-
called Document No. 9, in April 2013.124  That directive, officially 
titled “Communique on the Current State of the Ideological Sphere,” 
called on Party cadres to guard against seven “false ideological trends, 
positions, and activities,” including “promotion of Western 
constitutional democracy” and “promoting ‘universal values’ in an 
attempt to weaken the theoretical foundations of the Party’s 
leadership.”  Document No. 9 made clear that the Party viewed calls 
for constitutional reform as potentially subversive attempts to “use 
Western constitutional democracy to undermine the Party’s 
leadership [and] abolish the People’s Democracy.”125  
Just a month later, the first of many Leftist anti-constitutional 
pieces was published in the Party publication Red Flag Manuscripts.  
Official efforts to tamp down the liberal pro-constitutionalist debate 
through the use of Leftist rhetoric had begun.  
 
B. Beyond Southern Weekend: The Intellectual Debate 
 
Even from the debate’s first moments, it was clear that there 
was a fair amount of common ground between the Socialists and the 
Liberals.  Most fundamentally, both sides agreed that pro-reform 
                                                                                                               
123 Author interviews (on file with author).  See also Chris Buckley, China Takes Aim 
at Western Ideas, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/20/world/
asia/chinas-new-leadership-takes-hard-line-in-secret-memo.html.  The Times reports that, 
after Document No. 9 was issued, provincial-level officials made speeches directly linking 
the Southern Weekend Incident to the issuance of Document No. 9 and the subsequent 
crackdown on bloggers, journalists, lawyers, and others.  
124  The document began circulating online in Chinese several weeks after its 
promulgation.  See Document 9: A ChinaFile Translation, CHINAFILE (Nov. 8, 2013), 
http://www.chinafile.com/document-9-chinafile-translation.  
125 Although it did not refer to Southern Weekend by name, Document No. 9’s reference 
to “some people [who] still use the phrase ‘constitutional dream’ to distort the Chinese dream 
of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” would seem to be a clear-enough reference 
to the Guangzhou paper and the spiked pro-constitution editorial.  Id. 
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voices were growing stronger.126  In late January, Chinese Academy 
of Social Sciences economics researcher and prominent public 
intellectual Zhang Shuguang noted that “the voices calling for 
political system reform are quite strong.”127 At around the same time, 
activist and intellectual Wang Debang argued that “today, almost no 
one doubts that China must move toward democracy!”128  Other more 
mainstream scholars made similar points in more measured tones.129 
Another recurring theme was the “urgency” of reform, and the 
“anxiety” of many intellectuals over what might happen if political 
reform continued to take a back seat to economic reform.130  As one 
scholar noted, the urgency of reform had itself become a point of 
consensus.131  The urgency and the anxiety stemmed from concerns 
over China’s current situation, and the perception that certain 
problems, including corruption, abuse of power, and the protection of 
“vested interests” at the cost of the public good, had become all too 
common.  Public outrage over official abuse of power was being kept 
at bay only through ever-growing investments in an unchecked state 
stability apparatus dedicated to “stability maintenance” at all costs.132  
                                                                                                               
126 In early January, journalist and commentator Ye Tan noted that China’s New Year’s 
message for 2013 seemed to be “appeals for constitutionalism from all sides.”  Ye Tan (叶
檀), Shichang Jingji Yu Fazhi Shuishou Shi Xianzheng Guojia Jichu (市场经济与法治税收
是宪政国家基础) [A Market Economy and a Rule of Law Tax Collection System Are the 
Basis for a Constitutional Nation], FT CHINESE (Jan. 28, 2013), http://www.ftchinese.com/
story/001048350/?print=y.  
127 Zhang Shuguang (张曙光), Zhongguo Zhengzhi Tizhi Gaige de Tupokou (中国政治
体制改革的突破口) [The Breakthrough Point for Political System Reform in China], 
UNIRULE INST. ECON. (Jan. 30, 2013), http://www.unirule.org.cn/index.php?c=article&
id=988 (article deleted by censors, but now available at this source). 
128 Wang Debang (王德邦), Minjian Qiubian Yu Guanfu Yingbian Xuanxiang Xia de 
Zhongguo Zhuanxing Lujing (民间求变与官府应变选项下的中国转型路径) [Choosing 
Between Public Calls for Change and the Official Need for Change on China’s Transitional 
Path], BOXUN WANG (博讯网) [BOXUN NET] (Jan. 31, 2013), http://www.boxun.com/news/
gb/pubvp/2015/02/201502171154.shtml#.V_nFCsnJKT8.  
129 Wang Xiao (王霄), Shi Gan Xing Bang, Shou Zai Xing Xian (实干兴邦，首在行
宪) [For solid work and a rising nation, the first step is constitutional expertise], AI SIXIANG 
(爱思想) [LOVE THOUGHT] (Jan. 16, 2013), http://www.aisixiang.com/data/60727.html.  
130 Yuan Xunhui (袁训会), Zheng Yongnian Haiwai Kan Shibada: Kaiqi Zhongguo 
Xiandai Zhengzhi Yuannian (郑永年海外看十八大:开启中国现代政治元年) [Zheng 
Yongnian Looks at the 18th Party Congress from Overseas: Opening the New Era in Modern 
Chinese Politics], GUANCHAZHE (观察着) [THE OBSERVER] (Feb. 2, 2013), http://www.
guancha.cn/ZhengYongNian/2013_02_02_124768.shtml. 
131 Hua, supra note 11. 
132 Weng, supra note 99.  Prof. Cai noted that, since the 1990s, government policy had 
created the “three rapids”: rapid economic growth, rapid spread of corruption, and the rapid 
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Finally, many pieces suggested significant potential costs for 
the Party if it did not take advantage of the current window of 
opportunity and push forward with reforms sooner rather than later.  
“If the Party does not resolutely push forward with political system 
reform, the intensification of social conflict might cause the ruling 
party to miss the opportunity for reform,” Central Party School 
scholar Cai Xia told an interviewer in early February. 133  
Constitutional scholar Jiang Ping estimated that the Party had a five-
year window in which to pursue reform; if it failed to take action 
during that five year “golden period,” then China’s future will be 
“difficult to predict.”134  Constitutional scholar Hua Bingxiao gave 
the Party a bit more time, suggesting that the Party had a decade-long 
window of opportunity, after which, if no action was taken, it might 
“lose its ruling status,” and the nation would see “social division, 
economic decline, political upheaval, and national disintegration.”135 
 
1. Socialist Constitutionalism 
 
The Socialist Constitutionalists represent the mainstream of 
academic constitutional thinking in China.  At least within the halls 
of the academy, Socialist Constitutionalists vastly outnumber 
Liberals, who in turn outnumber the small handful of Leftist Anti-
Constitutionalists.  
Perhaps the core belief of Socialist Constitutionalists is that 
the existing 1982 Constitution can in fact be implemented, and that 
genuine constitutional reform can peacefully—even productively—
coexist side by side with the one-party system.  Socialists will fully 
acknowledge the CCP’s leadership position, and have even urged 
other scholars to do the same, as a key element of building support 
                                                                                                               
divergence of social interests.  These “three rapids” led to the creation of vested interests, 
who are now among the chief barriers to political reform.  
133 Id.  
134 Jiang Ping (江平) et al., Li Xian, Xing Xian, Xianzhi—Weilai Shinian Xianzheng 
Poju (立宪, 行宪, 宪治——未来十年宪政破局 ) [Establish Constitutionalism, 
Implement Constitutionalism, Constitutional Governance: The Constitutional Collapse of 
the Next Decade], XIANGGANG SHANG BAO (香港商报) [HONG KONG COMMERCIAL DAILY] 
(Feb. 25, 2013), http://www.21ccom.net/articles/zgyj/xzmj/article_2013030178048.html.  
135 Id.  
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol11/iss3/1
2016]                     ARGUING CHINESE CONSTITUTIONALISM     379 
 
within the Party for constitutional reforms that would, in essence, 
institutionalize and put limits on its use of political power.136 
Whereas others might see contradiction, the Socialist 
Constitutionalists see a textual reality that must be harmonized, and 
also, perhaps more importantly, a political reality that cannot be 
wished away.  They acknowledge that modern constitutional practice 
frowns upon the idea of naming and empowering a specific political 
party within the text of the constitutional document itself.  
Nonetheless, they would accept the reality that the 1982 Constitution 
enshrines the leadership position of the Chinese Communist Party, 
while at the same time putting forward a governmental structure in 
which state power is exercised through institutions, and in which all 
citizens are equal before the law.  
Socialist Constitutionalists are also more deeply enmeshed in 
theory than the Liberals: they have spent much time and effort 
attempting to reshape traditional understandings of socialist legal 
theory, which generally does not acknowledge the possibility of 
violations of individual rights by the Socialist state, thus obviating 
the need for judicial review. 137   The emphasis on theory often 
involves a heavy reliance on key quotations from early Socialist 
thinkers, including Marx and Engels, as well as from leading Chinese 
revolutionaries, including, most commonly, Mao and Deng.138    
This emphasis on theory partially explains the Socialists’ 
particularly vociferous response to the Leftists: the Leftists launched 
a frontal attack on the theoretical framework that the Socialists had 
so painstakingly constructed over many years.  Furthermore, the 
Leftists fundamentally challenged the relevance of the Socialists’ 
intellectual project of packaging constitutional norms and values in 
ways that would make them acceptable—both intellectually and 
                                                                                                               
136 Tong Zhiwei, Talking Constitutionalism No. 3: A Supplemental Exposition of the 
Socialist Constitutionalist Concept, GONGSHI WANG (共识网) [CONSENSUS NET] (June 4, 
2013) (“in a word, I urge the Chinese intellectual community not to challenge the CCP’s 
long-term constitutional governing position, and support the CCP’s leadership”). 
137 Kellogg, supra note 62.  
138 One method of reconciling the contradictions is to present the evolution of the legal 
system as a series of theoretical innovations, led by different generations of Chinese leaders. 
See, e.g., Wang Zhenmin (王振民), Xianfa Zhengzhi: Kai Wanshi Taiping Zhilu (宪法政
治:开万世太平之路) [Constitutional Politics: Starting on the Generational Road of Peace], 
GONGSHI WANG BOKE [共识网博客] [CONSENSUS BLOG] (Aug. 22, 2013), http://blog.
ifeng.com/article/29793109.html.  
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politically—to the CCP.  In some ways, the Liberals were off to one 
side of this conversation.  
Another key characteristic of Socialist Constitutionalists is 
their view of constitutional change as a state-directed, top-down 
process.  One Socialist scholar referred to constitutional reform as the 
Party’s “unshirkable historic mission,”139 another called it the Party’s 
“mission.”140  Despite the lack of progress on constitutional reform 
since the adoption of the 1982 Constitution, Socialists, for the most 
part, continue to maintain public support for, and publicly profess 
their belief in, a Party-led reform process.141   
It is unclear whether this professed faith in the Party’s 
willingness to eventually undertake constitutional reform is genuine, 
or whether it is more pragmatic in nature.  As leading Socialist 
Constitutionalist scholar Tong Zhiwei pointed out, the leading 
position of the CCP is an “objective fact,” one that cannot be changed 
as the result of anyone’s expression of opinion to the contrary.  
Furthermore, Tong argues, the Party’s accumulation of “economic 
resources, political resources, and state coercive force,” as well as 
                                                                                                               
139  Hua Bingxiao ( 华炳啸 ), Lun Fanxianzheng de Wuchi yu Qienuo: Huiying 
Fanxianzheng Guandian Xilie Zhi Er (论反宪政的无耻与怯懦:回应反宪政观点系列之
二 ) [On the Shamelessness and Gutlessness of the Anti-Constitutionalist Faction: 
Responding to the Anti-Constitutionalist Views, Part Two in a Series], HUA BINGXIAO DE 
BOKE (华炳啸的博客) [HUA BINGXIAO BLOG] (July 8, 2013), http://huabingxiao.blog.caixin.
com/archives/58851.   
140 Cai Xia (蔡霞), Tuijin Xianzheng Minzhu Yinggai Shi Zhongguo Gongchandang de 
Zhizheng Shiming (推进宪政民主应该是中国共产党的执政使命) [Pushing forward 
Democratic Constitutionalism Should be the Chinese Communist Party’s Governing 
Mission], GONGSHI WANG (共识网) [CONSENSUS NET] (May 30, 2013), http://www.21
ccom.net/articles/zgyj/xzmj/article_2011110648239.html.  See also Li Liangdong (李良栋
), Zhizhengdang Yinggai Shanyu Lingdao Zhengzhi Tizhi Gaige (执政党应该善于领导政
治体制改革 ) [The Governing Party Should Adeptly Lead the Reform of the Political 
System], XUEXI SHIBAO (学习时报) [STUDY TIMES] (Aug. 5, 2013), http://www.21ccom.
net/articles/zgyj/xzmj/article_2013080589108.html.  Prof. Li, a political scientist at the 
Central Party School, argued that the reform process in China has entered into an 
“exceedingly complex” period, and that further reform was “both urgent and formidably 
difficult.”  Li called on the Party to lead the reform process, and play the role of “designers 
and organizers of reform,” despite the fact that such reforms would face “unprecedented 
resistance” from “vested interests unwilling to see their interests harmed.”  Perhaps because 
of Professor Li’s strong Party credentials, the piece was widely circulated within China.   
141 Other scholars have pointed out that the Socialists also view their own role as central.  
As Xi’an-based scholar Chen Hongguo put it, the Socialist Constitutionalists “are full of 
self-confidence, they believe that only the Socialist Constitutionalists can provide a workable 
path for constitutional implementation, and so therefore carry with them a martyr’s spirt of 
sparing no efforts to reach comprehensive and effective constitutional implementation.”  
Chen, supra note 96.  
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support from key social and interest groups, means that its position is 
incontestable.142  This logic would seem to suggest mere acceptance 
of the status quo, rather than firm intellectual agreement and 
support.143   
Perhaps because the Socialists view the Party’s senior 
leadership as a key audience, they are more interested than the 
Liberals in political positioning.  Many Socialist Constitutionalists 
will go to great pains to distance themselves from “Western-style” 
constitutionalism, instead insisting that they are offering something 
distinctly Chinese, or at least something distinctive to the People’s 
Republic of China.144  They also draw repeated parallels between 
their theories and the so-called “socialist market economy,” the 
process of market-based reforms that began in China in the early 
1980s.145  
For many Socialist Constitutionalists, then, the key to 
constitutional reform is a signal from the Party that it is ready to move 
forward.  That is why many Socialist Constitutionalists latched onto 
Xi Jinping’s December 2012 comments on constitutional 
implementation: they hoped that those comments were in fact just the 
signal that they had been waiting for.146  In an interview less than two 
weeks after Xi’s December 4 speech, for example, Tong Zhiwei 
praised Xi’s comments on constitutional implementation, calling 
them a “positive sign.”147 
In terms of their substantive agenda, the Socialists support a 
program that is paradoxically both conservative and a potentially far-
reaching radical departure from the status quo.  In an attempt to put 
                                                                                                               
142 Tong, supra note 136.  
143  In that same piece, Tong expresses a certain “understanding” for his Liberal 
colleagues who have reservations about fixing the leadership position of the CCP within the 
Constitution itself.  The arrangement does, at times, lend itself to a certain “moodiness,” 
Tong acknowledges, as it fails to satisfy “man’s inherent instinct to pursue freshness.”  Id. 
144 Wang, supra note 138.  
145 Hua, supra note 139.  
146 Wang Xiao (王霄), Shi Gan Xing Bang, Shou Zai Xing Xian (实干兴邦，首在行
宪) [For solid work and a rising nation, the first step is constitutional expertise], Speech at 
the Second meeting of the Constitutionalism and Socialism Forum, AI SIXIANG (爱思想) 
[LOVE THOUGHT] (Jan. 16, 2013), http://www.aisixiang.com/data/60727.html.  
147 Tong Zhiwei (童之伟), Yixian Zhizheng Yaoqiu Quanmian Shishi Xianfa (“依宪执
政”要求全面实施宪法) [Tong Zhiwei: For “Public Administration According to the 
Constitution,” We Must Fully Implement the Constitution], TIME WEEKLY (时代周报) 
[SHIDAI ZHOUBAO] (Dec. 14, 2012), http://www.21ccom.net/articles/zgyj/xzmj/article_
2012121873161.html. 
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forward a plan that is at least at the outer edge of feasibility, Socialists 
have come up with a more minimalist definition of constitutionalism.  
This definition jettisons elements—like direct elections for national-
level leaders and multi-party democracy more generally148—that the 
CCP has made clear it cannot accept.  The CCP often criticizes more 
liberal scholars for adding too many elements to the list, thereby 
making the question of constitutional implementation more 
complicated than it otherwise might be.149  
For Shanghai-based scholar Tong Zhiwei, constitutionalism 
consists of three basic elements: a written constitution; limits on state 
power and protections for basic rights; and constitutional 
implementation, with a special emphasis on implementation of basic 
rights protections.150   By this logic, because China has a written 
constitution, because this Constitution enumerates basic rights, and 
because it delineates the specific powers of different branches of 
government, China is close to full constitutionalism.  Tong and other 
Socialists would argue it has the structure; it merely lacks for 
implementation of that existing constitutional structure.  In other 
words, by the Socialists’ reading, China is only one step away from 
constitutional governance: if a constitutional review mechanism is 
created, then China’s transition to constitutionalism will be complete.   
For many Socialist Constitutionalist scholars, identification 
of potential areas of reform that are both meaningful and politically 
acceptable to the CCP leadership is a key intellectual task.  Whenever 
the Party has experimented with different reforms, such as local-level 
elections, open budget processes, and the development of OGI 
regulations, Socialists have trumpeted their constitutional 
implications, and have pushed – largely unsuccessfully, it must be 
said – for their broader adoption. 
Tong Zhiwei himself has put forward a four-pronged reform 
plan, one that combines longstanding reformist elements with some 
new ideas.  He proposes that the Party adopt legislative measures to 
protect basic citizen rights, with a special focus on the rights of 
citizens to “criticize and supervise” official behavior; establish a plan 
                                                                                                               
148 Wang, supra note 138.  See also Cai, supra note 3. 
149  Xu Qianchuan (徐潜川 ), Tong Zhiwei, Wang Tingyou, He Weifang: Liu Wen 
Xianzheng Sanfang (童之伟 汪亭友 贺卫方:六问 “宪政三方”) [Tong Zhiwei, Wang 
Tingyou, He Weifang: Six Questions for the Three Parties of Constitutionalism], CAIJING 
(July 15, 2013), http://www.aisixiang.com/data/65769.html. 
150 Tong, supra note 136. 
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for expansion of direct elections for People’s Congresses at higher 
levels than currently countenanced; strengthen judicial 
independence; and adopt institutionalized measures for strengthened 
external oversight of the police and for “strictly constraining the 
activities of the state security apparatus so as to practically improve 
protection citizens’ freedom of person and freedom of 
communications.”151  
This four-pronged agenda illustrates the conservative and 
progressive elements of the Socialist Constitutionalist reform agenda.  
At least the first three of these proposals have been put forward 
repeatedly by intellectuals and, at times over the past twenty years, 
by the Party itself, which means that they are within the realm of 
political possibility.  At the same time, if actually implemented, these 
reforms would constitute a significant step forward in terms of reform 
of China’s political system, and would dwarf the minimal progress 
on political system reform over the past two decades.  
Some more liberal scholars have suggested that one key flaw 
of the Socialist Constitutionalists’ approach is that they do not engage 
directly with the human rights situation in China: they are too 
theoretical and not sufficiently engaged with the actual situation in 
China.  They emphasize theoretical concerns and debate the merits of 
various reform models, while leaving aside—at least in their public 
writings—any detailed analysis of the political barriers to 
constitutional reform.  
 
2. The Liberals 
 
Before the Leftists joined the debate in May 2013, the reform 
conversation was primarily between the Socialist Constitutionalists 
and the Liberal Constitutionalists.  Often referred to as the Pan-
Constitutionalists or Enlightenment Liberals, the Liberals include in 
their camp a number of prominent public intellectuals, including 
Beijing University professors He Weifang and Zhang Qianfan; 
Shanghai-based legal scholar and lawyer Zhang Xueyou; political 
scientist Fang Shaowei; and regional security expert Zhao Chu.  In 
general, the Liberals favor more far-reaching constitutional reforms, 
and more openly embrace Western models of state organization.  
They question the appetite of the Party for meaningful structural 
reform of the political system, and therefore are skeptical of the 
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prospects for further progress under the existing constitutional 
framework.  Often, Liberals are more likely to look at debates over 
constitutional development as more strategic than substantive.  
Lurking behind many of their public commentaries are questions 
about how to address political barriers to constitutional reform.  
The Liberals also display a deeper commitment to core 
constitutional norms and values,152 and as a result, are less likely than 
the Socialists to suggest compromise, for example on the need for 
direct elections as part of multi-party constitutional democracy, or on 
the need to end the CCP’s constitutionally-enshrined leadership 
position as a key prerequisite of constitutional reform. 
Indeed, just as the Socialists seek to harmonize seeming 
textual contradictions, the Liberals often call attention to them, 
arguing that they demonstrate the very real difficulties of meaningful 
reform under the existing structure. 153   They also note that the 
Constitution enshrines various doctrines, such as NPCSC oversight 
of the court system, which cut against fundamental constitutional 
norms, such as separation of powers.154  Liberals also point to the raft 
of laws and regulations that would seem to violate basic rights 
protections, including rights to free speech, free association, and 
freedom of religion, as further evidence of the legal contradictions 
that would have to be resolved if constitutional development were to 
proceed.155  
These textual contradictions, combined with the lack of 
progress on political reform in recent years, have led many Liberals 
to openly express doubts over the strategic wisdom of the Socialists’ 
approach of, in essence, trying to convince the Party that 
constitutional reform can move forward without putting the core of 
the one-party system at risk.  Many Liberals fear that that the Party 
                                                                                                               
152 Chen, supra note 96.  
153 While the most significant contradiction has to do with the enshrining of the CCP’s 
leadership position within the Preamble of the Constitution itself, there are other concerns.  
Beijing University scholar He Weifang points to the various provisions of the Chinese 
Constitution (specifically Articles 8, 12, and 13) that cover state and private ownership of 
land.  He points out that different forms of property in China are, in practice, often accorded 
very different levels of protection by the state.  Such Constitutional provisions, He argues, 
“are not in accordance with the spirit of constitutionalism.”  Xu, supra note 149.  
154 Id.  Article 67 of the Chinese Constitution gives the NPCSC the power to “supervise” 
the work of the SPC.  Article 104 grants similar powers to provincial and local People’s 
Congress Standing Committees.  Article 128 states that the SPC shall be “responsible to” the 
NPCSC.  
155 Id.  
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has lost interest in meaningful political reform,156 not least because 
such reform would limit their own power.157  Instead of focusing on 
Party-led, top-down reform strategies, the Liberals argue, would-be 
reformers should focus on bottom-up approaches to reform, engaging 
the broader public and helping to build a social consensus in favor of 
constitutional development.158 
In contrast to the Socialists, the Liberals are more likely to 
define constitutionalism more broadly, and to see the component 
parts as mutually-reinforcing, and therefore all equally vital.  The key 
components most often mentioned include separation of powers, 
judicial independence, protection of basic rights, and civilian control 
of the military.159  Prominent Liberal Zhang Qianfan put forward a 
six-point “consensus” agenda for structural reform, which included 
democratization of the CCP; elections for key Party and government 
posts; protection of free speech; market liberalization reforms; 
professionalization of the court system; and substantive 
implementation of the constitution.160  
Finally, Liberals are more likely to link the need for 
constitutional reform more directly to the overall country context, and 
to openly embrace the political, rather than purely academic, aspects 
of reform.161  In an August 2013 speech at the pro-reform think tank 
Tianze Economic Research Institute, Liberal scholar Zhang Qianfan 
argued that the reformist approach of the past two decades, one which 
                                                                                                               
156 Zhao Chu (赵楚), Shexian Lun de Da Shenhua (社宪论的大神话) [The Great 
Mythologies of the Socialist Constitutionalists], ZHAO CHU DU JIA PINGLUN (赵楚独家评论) 
[ZHAO CHU EXCLUSIVE COMMENTARIES] (June 6, 2013), http://zhaochuboke.blog.163.
com/blog/static/2073191472013563359853/.  Zhao points out that the Leftist attacks on 
Socialist Constitutionalism have “once again clearly pointed out that the dictatorial system 
does not tolerate constitutionalism.”  
157 Du Daozheng (杜导正), Zhengzhi Tizhi Gaige Yinggai Zhongbu Qianjinle (政治体
制改革应该中步前进了 ) [Political System Reform Should be Striding Forward], 
YANHUANG CHUNQIU (炎黄春秋) [ANNALS OF THE YELLOW EMPEROR] (Sept. 12, 2012), 
http://www.21ccom.net/articles/zgyj/xzmj/article_2012091967982.html.  
158 Zhao, supra note 156.  In Zhao’s view, constitutional transition in China needs the 
input of scholars, but “really it is a political movement,” one that, in accordance with modern 
constitutionalism, should be rest on a broad-based social contract in favor of constitutional 
reform.  See also Du, supra note 157. 
159 Chen, supra note 96.   
160 Zhang Qianfan (张千帆), Zhongguo Dangqian Zuida Weixian Shi Quezhi Tizhi 
Gongshi (中国当前最大危险是缺乏体制共识) [Contemporary China’s Greatest Danger 
is that it Lacks Systemic Consensus], MENGSHAN YEYI DE BOKE (蒙山野逸的博客 ) 
[Mengshan Yeyi Blog] (Mar. 19, 2013), http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_9c28f2160101gwt5.
html. 
161 Zhao, supra note 156.  
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emphasized economic reforms while paying little if any attention to 
political reform, was deeply flawed.162  That approach, Zhang argued, 
had generated huge external costs, doing deep damage to China’s 
environment, its natural resources, its social institutions, and even to 
public morale.  Under such circumstances, Zhang argued, official 
corruption would inevitably skyrocket, creating an additional barrier 
to eventual political reform.  
In Zhang’s view, China’s current path, of maintaining a 
narrow focus on economic reform without addressing very real 
shortcomings in China’s political system, is unsustainable.  “If we 
continue with this approach to reform,” Zhang stated flatly, “the costs 
of corruption will go higher and higher.”  Without a shift in direction, 
Zhang argued, China’s future prospects would be grim:  
 
My conclusion is this: without a larger environment 
of constitutional governance, without at least some 
basic improvements in the political and legal 
environment, our economic reforms will continue to 
follow a distorted path, and in the end will lead to 
outcomes that none of us want to see.163 
 
The only solution, Zhang argued, was constitutionalism.  In 
essence, Zhang argued, “without constitutional governance, reform is 
nonsense.”  
For Zhang and other Liberals, constitutional reform is the 
best—perhaps the only—means to avoid future calamities.  In a 
March 2013 essay, Zhang argued that, in the absence of wide-ranging 
reforms, China was facing a potential “crisis.”  This word was used 
by a number of scholars throughout the 2013 debate.164  
Because they view constitutional development as an 
inherently political, rather than academic, process, the Liberals often 
call for broader social consensus on political reform.  They more 
directly address key strategic questions of top-down versus bottom-
up change, and are more likely to see a need for broad-based social 
mobilization to push for reform.  Accordingly, many prominent 
                                                                                                               
162 Zhang Qianfan (张千帆), Meiyou Xianzheng, Gaige Jiu Shi Chedan (没有宪政，
改革就是扯淡 ) [Without Constitutional Governance, Reform is Nonsense], XINWEN 
LAOBING DE BOKE (新闻老兵的博客 ) [VETERAN JOURNALIST BLOG] (Aug. 2, 2013), 
http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_5974c0620102e7nl.html.  
163 Id.  
164 Zhang, supra note 160.  
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Liberals seek to engage a broader public audience beyond the halls of 
the academy.  
 
IV. STAGE TWO OF THE DEBATE: THE ANTI-
CONSTITUTIONALIST WAVE 
 
Leftist anti-constitutional statements are not totally unknown 
—there are some precedents, including a 2004 piece by an obscure 
scholar named Chen Hongtai, 165  for example.  But by and large, 
Leftist views have been largely absent from mainstream legal-
constitutional debate in China over the last three decades.166  The 
return of Leftist constitutional argument in some of the most 
prominent theoretical journals in the country took many scholars by 
surprise.  
The arguments put forward by the Leftists were often taken 
directly from classic Socialist legal theory, and thus cannot be said to 
be particularly innovative or insightful.  In many ways, their 
arguments reflect Chinese constitutional scholarship of the pre-
reform era.  Not surprisingly, then, the response from more 
mainstream scholars, many of whom view themselves as offering the 
very innovations to Socialist legal theory that would allow China to 
move forward with Constitutional development, were dismissive of 
the first wave of Leftist writings that began to appear in late May and 
June 2013.  
That dismissiveness, however, represented a missed 
opportunity: though it is true that the main arguments of the Leftist 
scholars are of limited intellectual value, nonetheless, various pieces 
do contain some content that may indirectly shed some light on the 
views of some in the Party leadership on the dangers of liberal 
constitutional values to the Party’s continuing hold on political power.  
                                                                                                               
165 Qian Gang, The Uncertain Death of ‘Constitutionalism,’ CHINA MEDIA PROJECT 
(Sept. 2, 2013), http://cmp.hku.hk/2013/09/02/33944/.  Chen’s piece appeared in the 
November 2004 issue of the obscure theoretical journal TRENDS IN THEORETICAL RESEARCH, 
and was titled, “Views and Reasons Why the Term ‘Constitutionalism’ Cannot Be Used.”  
In November 2005, the journal PARTY HISTORY ran an anti-constitutional piece by Xin Yan, 
entitled “‘Constitutionalism’ Cannot Be Taken as a Basic Political Concept for Our Country.”  
Both pieces mirrored arguments put forward by Yang Xiaoqing and other anti-
constitutionalists in 2013.  
166  That said, elements of Leftist arguments have remained a key component of 
Communist Party discourse, even as other, more modern strains of thought have also made 
their way into Party debates.  
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The first the anti-constitutionalist piece was penned by legal 
scholar Yang Xiaoqing, whose article, “Comparative Research on 
Constitutionalism and the People’s Democratic System,” 167  was 
published in the Party journal Red Flag Manuscripts on May 22.  
Yang’s “Comparative Research on Constitutionalism and the 
People’s Democratic System” is in some ways a walk backwards in 
time, to the pre-reform era, when China’s legal academy was still 
dominated by Socialist legal theory, which held that Western-style 
constitutionalism was in fact a tool of suppression, used by economic 
elites—the capitalist class—to oppress society as a whole, and 
maintain control of the political system.  Quoting liberally from Marx, 
Engels, and Lenin, as well as Chinese leaders like Mao, Deng, and 
Jiang Zemin, Yang argues that “the key systemic elements and 
principles of constitutionalism only belong to capitalist dictatorship, 
and are not part of the Socialist People’s Democratic System.” 
Though Yang was repeatedly excoriated for engaging in 
Cultural Revolution-style political invective, in fact her piece merely 
regurgitated the basic tenets of Socialist legal theory, and applied 
them, one by one, to the supposed advantages of the key components 
of Western constitutional systems including parliamentary 
democracy, separation of powers, judicial independence, and state 
control of the military.  Her review of these elements led her to 
conclude that China’s Socialist legal system is in fact superior, and 
that such elements are “not suitable” for China.  
Interestingly, save for passing references to the Southern 
Weekend controversy and liberal scholars who advocate for more 
wholesale reforms, Yang’s main target in the piece was the Socialist 
Constitutionalist camp.  She argued that this camp was “pandering to 
the political might and rhetorical hegemony” of Western 
constitutionalism.  
And yet, Yang did not fully reject Western constitutional 
theory and practice as completely irrelevant to the Chinese context.  
Instead, she noted that many Socialist systems have adopted 
secondary elements of the liberal democratic constitutional system, 
including market economics, protection of human rights, freedom of 
                                                                                                               
167 Yang Xiaoqing (杨晓青), Xianzheng Yu Renmin Minzhu Zhidu Zhi Bijiao Yanjiu 
(宪政与人民民主制度之比较研究) [Comparative Research on Constitutionalism and 
People’s Democratic System], HONGQI WENGAO (红旗文稿) [RED FLAG MANUSCRIPTS] 
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religion, and legislative oversight of government budgets.168  But, she 
argued, the adoption of these elements by China had led some 
Socialist Constitutionalist scholars to argue that China has already 
become a Socialist Constitutional state.  Yang warned that this 
argument is very dangerous; it could “handcuff” China and lead it 
down the path of the Soviet Union, toward inevitable state collapse.   
Over the next few weeks, Yang’s piece was followed by 
others in a similar vein.  On May 29, for example, the Party 
theoretical journal Party Constructs ran a piece by one Zheng 
Zhixue—a pen name169—entitled “Recognizing the Essential Nature 
of ‘Constitutionalism.’”170  That piece repeated many of the same 
basic arguments advanced by Yang Xiaoqing, including the core 
argument that constitutionalism is a “capitalist” political and 
economic system unsuitable for Socialist China.  
At the same time, however, Zheng’s piece was not an all-out 
attack on Socialist Constitutionalists.  Zheng notes that “intentions 
(of the Socialist Constitutionalists) are good,” even if their ideas are 
“vague,” “specious,” and “erroneous.”  To adopt constitutionalism as 
a core value, Zheng argues, would be to “fall into a rhetorical trap.”  
Zheng decried what he saw as the faddishness of Chinese study of 
Western political and legal theories, and warned of the dangers of 
“being led around by the nose” by the “capitalist” theory of 
constitutionalism.  Such actions, Zheng stated flatly, would be 
equivalent to “intellectual surrender.”  
Perhaps Zheng’s most interesting point is his suggestion of a 
slippery slope associated with constitutional reforms.  Zheng argued 
that, if China adopted constitutionalism or even socialist 
constitutionalism as a key guiding concept, then leading liberal 
constitutional theories will “spread unchecked,” leading to “increased 
confusion” in the broader ideological sphere.  “Foreign and domestic 
hostile forces” would use the additional space created to “gradually 
compel us to use liberal constitutionalist theory” and to implement 
                                                                                                               
168 Interestingly, Yang cites media freedom as a secondary characteristic of democratic 
constitutionalist systems that have not been adopted by Socialist countries, an implicit 
commentary on the role of the media in China and its relationship to the Party’s propaganda 
apparatus.  
169 The true identity of the author of the Party Constructs piece was the subject of some 
speculation among Chinese academics.  
170  Zheng Zhixue (郑志学 ), Renqing Xianzheng de Benzhi (认清宪政的本质 ) 
[Recognizing the Essential Nature of ‘Constitutionalism’], DANGJIAN (党建 ) [PARTY 
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“so-called Socialist constitutionalism,” and would thus “interfere 
with the implementation and direction of our nation’s political system 
reform.”  This suggestion of constitutional reform as an all-or-
nothing proposition may in fact explain the reluctance of many in the 
Party to embrace even modest changes to the political system over 
the past twenty years.  
The third key piece in the first wave of anti-constitutional 
writings was Wang Tingyou’s essay, also published in Red Flag 
Manuscripts, entitled, “A Few Thoughts on the Problem of 
Constitutionalism.”171  Perhaps unsurprisingly given his post at the 
People’s University Marxism Institute, Wang’s essay focused heavily 
on Marxist theory and did not spend much time attacking pro-
constitutional advocates.  He did, however, note that Western nations 
hope to use constitutionalism as a “breakthrough point,” one that can 
“progressively abolish the leadership of the Communist Party and the 
Socialist system.”   
In some ways, the particular thrust of the Leftists’ arguments 
mattered less than the politics behind them.  There were various hints 
that the Leftist attacks may have been orchestrated by senior Party 
officials, or at least been launched with their blessing.  The timing of 
the attacks, roughly one month after the issuance of the so-called 
Document No. 9, led many to wonder whether there was in fact a 
connection between the Party’s anti-constitutionalist rhetoric as 
articulated in Document No. 9, and the leftist wave started by Yang.  
Second, the use of key Party theoretical outlets, including Red Flag, 
Red Flag Manuscripts, and Party Constructs, strongly suggested the 
involvement of the Party ideological apparatus.  Finally, the fact that 
these articles circulated widely online, while pro-constitutional 
voices were often censored, indicated that Party propaganda officials 
were playing an active role in managing the debate.172   
It seems clear, then, that the May-June spate of Leftist articles 
bore the Party’s fingerprints, even if the identity of the specific Party 
leaders pushing the Leftist line remained unknown.  And yet, if the 
Leftist push had stopped there, it likely would have been brushed off 
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by moderates as a temporary aberration, as nothing more than the 
frustrated musings of the Party’s Leftist camp.  The fact that the 
attacks were penned by a group of marginal scholars, often writing 
under assumed names, only reinforced the notion that the attacks in 
May and June were not a serious threat, and were probably not 
connected with the highest reaches of the Party leadership.173  
After a lull in July, the Leftist attacks were renewed in early 
August.  The second wave of attacks was much sharper, and much 
more political, than the first.  
The renewed push began with three pieces in the People’s 
Daily overseas edition by one Ma Zhongcheng, an alias.174  The first 
piece, published on August 5, was entitled, “Constitutionalism is 
essentially a weapon in the war of public opinion.” That piece focused 
less on abstruse theoretical arguments over the relationship between 
Marxism and constitutionalism.  Instead, the article focused much 
more heavily on politics, and in particular, on political attack.  Ma 
made clear that scholars advocating for constitutionalism in fact were 
looking to “overthrow” the socialist system, and therefore needed to 
be watched.  
Ma’s first opinion piece also differed from the earlier 
academic Leftist pieces in its increased emphasis on the role of the 
United States in helping to support constitutionalist, and even 
socialist constitutionalist, discourse, and in his drawing of 
comparisons between the 2013 Constitutional debate and the collapse 
of the Soviet Union.  According to Ma, concepts like “democratic 
socialism” and “socialist constitutionalism” are viewed by the CIA as 
the “most effective weapons” in the war against socialism.175  
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Ma also draws an implicit parallel between Socialist 
Constitutionalist advocates and the reformist leaders of the Soviet 
Union in the 1980s, suggesting that seemingly moderate systemic 
reforms can lead quite quickly to state collapse.  Once again, a Leftist 
article reflects very real debates and concerns within the Party elite, 
that Constitutionalism is one of a number of Liberal reforms that 
represent the first step in a slippery slope toward the end of one-Party 
rule.  
Ma’s second piece, “American Constitutionalism in Name 
Only,” focused more closely on what Ma referred to as the “myths” 
of American constitutional governance.176  In particular, Ma argued 
that the US constitution, rather than being an instrument for the 
protection of individual rights, instead acts as a tool for capitalist 
domination of the working classes; it therefore compares unfavorably, 
Ma points out, with China’s constitution, which enshrines the 
dictatorship of the proletariat.  
The third piece in Ma’s series, “In China, Pushing So-Called 
Constitutional Governance Can Only Be Like Climbing a Tree to 
Catch Fish,” also put forward the argument that socialist 
constitutionalism was even more “misleading” than Liberal 
constitutionalism. 177   Further, the piece linked Socialist 
Constitutionalist theory to reform theories that led to the collapse of 
the Soviet Union.  The piece concluded by reiterating the leadership 
position of the Chinese Communist Party, as enshrined in the 
Constitution’s preamble.  
This initial spate of articles significantly upped the rhetorical 
ante, and also signaled a higher degree of Party involvement: unlike 
the series of May articles, written largely by academics in Party-
affiliated theoretical journals, the early August pieces were shorter, 
and used more pugnacious, and overtly political, language.  They 
were also published in more prominent outlets, including the 
People’s Daily overseas edition.  These pieces were one step closer 
to a formal Party statement on constitutionalism.178  
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The Ma Zhongcheng series of articles was followed by two 
pieces of somewhat obscure origin: “’Constitutionalist’ Theory 
Interferes With and Misleads China’s Reform,” by Zheng Li, and 
“The Constitutionalist Wave is Challenge to the Spirit of the 18th 
Party Congress,” by Gao Xiang. 179   Those pieces, published on 
September 20th and 21st, continued the attacks on both Liberal 
Constitutionalist and Socialist Constitutionalist camps, often using 
even harder-edged language than Ma Zhongcheng.  
And yet, some observers held out hope that the May-June 
academic articles and the August spate of opinion pieces were not in 
fact a formal intervention from the top Party leadership, but rather an 
unsanctioned attempt by a no doubt well-connected and influential 
group within the Party to stir the ideological pot.  Hong Kong 
University-based scholar and media analyst Qian Gang, for example, 
pointed to the fact that all of the anti-constitutionalist pieces appeared 
in outlets just below the highest, most authoritative level.180  If the 
Party leadership wanted to send a clear message, Qian argued, why 
not issue a clear and authoritative statement in the Party’s flagship 
People’s Daily?181  Further, Qian argued, the rather crude rhetorical 
style of some of the pieces suggested that the Party’s most senior 
ideologues were in fact not the authors of the August attacks.   
Those hopes were dashed only a month later with the release 
of a series of strongly-worded attack pieces by provincial Party 
secretaries and provincial propaganda chiefs, many of them published 
in the most authoritative Party outlets, including People’s Daily itself.  
This wave of articles, which included pieces by thirty-one 
senior provincial-level officials, stemmed from an August 19 speech 
by Xi Jinping at a National Propaganda Work Conference on the 
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importance of the “public opinion struggle.” 182   Though initial 
reporting on the speech, which has not been made public, used a more 
moderate tone in summarizing Xi’s remarks, later reports 
characterized the speech as having a harder edge, and many linked 
the phrase “public opinion struggle” directly to Xi’s remarks.183  
It seems clear, then, that the Leftist push that began in May 
was orchestrated by the CCP from the very beginning as a 
coordinated effort to manage the public conversation on political 
reform.  The fact that the Leftist push was undertaken with the 
approval of senior Party leaders, most likely including Xi himself, 
speaks to the need of the Party to maintain control over the 
Constitution.  The Party cannot allow it to be subverted by others for 
what it sees as anti-Party purposes.  In essence, it cannot maintain the 
Constitution as a legitimacy-enhancing false blueprint if others are 
able to either successfully push for it to become a legally-binding 
document, or successfully expose the Constitution as a legally 
meaningless sham constitution.  
Many of the provincial-level responses, which must have 
been coordinated by central authorities, made specific mention of 
constitutionalism as a “Western” tool to infiltrate China and subvert 
the rule of the CCP.  One representative piece, written by Hubei 
Province propaganda Minister Yin Hanning, referred to 
constitutionalism and universal values as “beautiful lies,” and urged 
close attention to the “rhetorical traps” set by Western states.184  
Though Minister Yin’s piece—along with the pieces by other 
provincial-level ministers—used strong language to condemn 
constitutionalism, nonetheless these pieces, and those that followed, 
marked a subtle shift in Party-sanctioned rhetoric on 
constitutionalism.  Unlike, say, the Ma Zhongcheng series of articles, 
which attacked both Socialist Constitutionalism and Liberal 
constitutionalism as very real anti-Party threats, Minister Yin 
remained silent on mainstream socialist constitutionalist thought.  His 
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piece, and those written by his colleagues, may have represented a 
turning point in the Party’s approach to the Socialist debate, the first 
step toward a return to a status quo ante in which the Party largely 
tolerated academic discussion of Socialist Constitutionalism theories, 
even as it held the line on refusing to implement meaningful 
constitutional reforms of the sort advocated by Socialists and Liberals 
alike.  
This small but significant shift was carried into the pages of 
the People’s Daily itself in late September.185  The first People’s 
Daily piece on the 2013 Constitutionalism debate, written by Shanxi 
province Party Secretary Yuan Chunqing and entitled “Leading 
Cadres Must Strengthen Their Political Convictions,” criticized both 
universal values and Western-style constitutionalism, but did not 
mention Socialist Constitutionalism as one of several “false 
ideologies” that Party cadres must resolutely guard against.186  The 
omission of Socialist Constitutionalism from the authoritative 
People’s Daily piece was telling.  
A mid-October article in Seeking Truth by Autumn Stone—
an alias—entitled “Consolidate the Common Intellectual Foundation 
of the United Struggle of the Party and the People” took the process 
of winding down the anti-constitutionalist push one step further.187  
In it, the author emphasizes the “extreme importance” of a common 
intellectual foundation, one that can unite the Party and the people 
under the leadership of the CCP.  
Like Yuan Chunqing before him, Autumn Stone cast 
aspersions on the “international anti-China forces” who “push a 
strategy of Westernizing and splitting China.”  Yet the subtle 
differences between the Autumn Stone piece and Yuan Chunqing’s 
piece are in some ways more important than their commonalities.  
Interestingly, Autumn Stone does not excoriate “universal values” 
such as freedom, democracy, and human rights; instead, he reverts to 
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established Party practice of using such terms for the Party’s own 
ends.  
Perhaps most importantly, Autumn Stone offered some 
qualified support for constitutionalism, arguing that the Party has 
historically supported “ruling the country according to the 
Constitution.”  He launched a much more calibrated attack on 
supporters of constitutional reform, singling out for criticism only 
those who believe that “’constitutional democracy’ is almost the only 
topic of discussion on political reform.”  Explicitly excluding 
supporters of Socialist Constitutionalism, Autumn Stone attacked 
unnamed Liberals who would have China adopt Western-style 
constitutionalism, and in so doing “cancel the leadership of the CCP, 
and change our nation’s socialist system.”  
Harsh though this language may sound, it is still vastly 
different from the line adopted just two months earlier by Ma 
Zhongcheng and others.  In signaling that Socialist Constitutionalism 
would once again return to the realm of acceptable discourse, those 
behind the Autumn Stone piece were bringing an end the rhetorical 
battle against mainstream academic constitutionalist discourse.  
Why would the Party wind down its anti-Constitutionalist 
campaign just a few months after it began?  There are at least four 
key reasons that explain the Party’s retrenchment: first, the anti-
constitutionalist campaign had achieved its goal of pushing back 
against growing calls in the first months of 2013 for constitutional 
reform.  Second, the new Party leadership led by Xi Jinping had 
inoculated itself against charges that it was soft on Rightist would-be 
reformers, thus making it easier to move forward with right-leaning 
economic reforms.  Third, bringing the debate to a close helped to 
clear the ideological air in advance of the Third Plenum, which was 
held in November.   
Finally, bringing the debate to a close would return the 
conversation to the status quo ante, and would allow the Party to 
revert to its position of touting constitutional reform, falsely, as part 
of its own political reform agenda.  Less than a year after the end of 
the debate, Party Secretary Xi Jinping himself returned to 
constitutionalist rhetoric, closing the circle that he had opened with 
his December 4, 2012 constitutionalist speech.  In a September 2014 
speech marking the 60th anniversary of the founding of the National 
People’s Congress, Xi declared that “(t)he Constitution is the most 
basic law of our country.  Rule of the nation by law means, first and 
foremost, ruling the nation in accord with the constitution; governing 
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by laws is, first and foremost, governing in accord with the 
constitution.” 188   Other references to constitutional governance 
would follow over the course of the fall, signaling Xi’s intent to return 
to constitutionalist rhetoric—if not action—as a key element of the 
Party’s search for political legitimacy.  
The end of the debate as signaled by Yin and Autumn Stone 
also allowed mainstream academic voices to return to their prior 
practice of making pro-constitutionalist statements that would, by and 
large, reinforce the Party’s constitutional reformist credentials.  
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the responses of many intellectuals to the 
Leftist push ignored the clear and abundant evidence of senior Party 
involvement in the short-lived anti-constitutionalist campaign.  For 
many moderate intellectuals, a return to the status quo, in which 
constitutional reform is always on the horizon, was a welcome return 
to normalcy that they quickly embraced.  
 
V. SOCIALIST (AND OTHER) RESPONSES: A RETURN TO 
THE STATUS QUO 
 
Given that Leftist voices like Yang Xiaoqing’s have been 
marginalized for decades, many mainstream academics were taken 
by surprise by the high-profile spate of Leftist attacks on mainstream 
Socialist constitutionalist thought.  
Many public intellectuals—including those from disciplines 
other than law, politics, and philosophy—simply lamented the return 
of such extreme Leftist rhetoric.189  For many Chinese of a certain 
age, such arcane and hard-edged terminology is redolent of the highly 
charged – and highly dangerous—political discourse of the Cultural 
Revolution, whose excesses are part of the lived experience of many 
older Chinese intellectuals.  
For those who were direct participants in the 
constitutionalism debate, however, the Leftist push was a direct 
attack on their own painstaking intellectual contributions to China’s 
political development.  A response—hopefully a vigorous one—was 
needed.  
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Initial responses from Socialist constitutionalists to Yang 
Xiaoqing and her colleagues were often dismissive: one prominent 
Socialist academic referred to the writings of Yang Xiaoqing and her 
cohort as “laughable” and “preposterous,” 190  mocking her as 
someone who “does not understand Marxism.” 191   Others used 
similarly dismissive language.  
But what was most notable about many of the mainstream 
Socialist responses was the lack of analysis of the broader political 
import of the anti-constitutionalist push.  Instead of asking the most 
basic question of why such pieces were appearing in prominent Party 
outlets, most Socialists instead busied themselves with substantive 
legal and theoretical responses, refuting Yang and others point by 
point.  It could be argued that such responses missed the point: if 
Party elders were using the anti-constitutionalists to throw cold water 
on the constitutionalist debate, then legal arguments would have little 
impact on the CCP leadership’s political calculus.  
Take, for example, the response of prominent Socialist 
constitutionalist Hua Bingxiao.  In a series of heavily-footnoted 
papers published in the months following Yang’s piece, Hua argued 
that Yang had fundamentally misconstrued Socialist legal theory, in 
part by ignoring the contributions to that theory by Hua himself and 
other key Socialist constitutionalist scholars.192  In Hua’s view, Yang 
“perfected the art of distortion.”  By pretending that other schools of 
Chinese socialist thought did not exist, Yang created a universe in 
which the only two options available were her (in Hua’s view, 
simplistic and retrograde) take on Socialist constitutionalism, and 
“Western, capitalist” constitutionalism. 193   Only through such 
“deceitful methods” could Yang attain even a minimal level of 
legitimacy for her “absurd theories,” Hua argued.194  Using a clutch 
of references from Marx, Lenin, the German political theorist Herbert 
Marcuse, Bukharin, Mao, and others, Hua then went on to elaborate 
a complex and highly theoretical argument as to why, in the end, 
Socialist legal theory and constitutionalism complement, rather than 
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contradict, each other.  He condemned Yang and her colleagues as 
Stalinists for their failure to recognize this fact.195  
Instead of asking difficult questions about the political import 
of the series of Leftist attack pieces, Hua went so far as to suggest 
that the tail might be wagging the dog: he accused Leftists like Yang 
of attempting to “trick Party and state senior leading cadres,” and of 
trying to “drive a wedge between the Party, intellectuals, and the great 
masses.”196  To be fair, Hua was writing before the publication of 
similar anti-constitutionalist pieces published by several dozen Party 
officials in September 2013.  Those pieces make clear the connection 
between the Party leadership and the anti-constitutionalist rhetoric 
that appeared from May to November 2013.  
Yet many scholars writing after September 2013 continued to 
describe anti-constitutionalists as extreme Leftists who were fighting 
against Xi Jinping’s reformist agenda.  Tsinghua University physicist 
and political commentator Ge Weikun, for example, cast anti-
constitutionalists as fighting against “Chairman Xi’s vision” on 
behalf of vested interests, who seek to “defend [their] illegal 
occupation of economic wealth and state power, and continue their 
suppression of calls for democracy.” 197   Such responses, though 
erroneous, benefit the Party, by casting the CCP senior leadership as 
fighting against vested interests and also fighting for constitutional 
reform.  Some commentators even went so far as to map the purge of 
Chongqing Party chief Bo Xilai and his apparent ally Zhou Yongkang 
by Xi Jinping and others in the Party leadership onto the debate 
between Yang Xiaoqing and her fellow Leftists and the Socialist 
Constitutionalists, with Yang and her colleagues cast in the roles of 
the evil duo, Bo and Zhou.198  
Other responses focused less on theoretical questions and 
more on political positioning as well as the practical difficulties of 
reform.  Wuhan University law professor Qin Qianhong, for example, 
argued in an October 2013 piece that Socialist constitutionalism 
should be seen as avoiding the excesses of both the Left (anti-
constitutionalists) and the Right (the Liberals); as such, it was ideally 
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suited to offer a feasible path to constitutional reform.199  Echoing 
previous arguments made by other Socialist scholars, Qin asserted 
that, unlike other camps, the views of the Socialist constitutionalists 
could serve as the basis for a wide-ranging consensus which would 
include both the vast majority of constitutional scholars and the Party 
itself.  
Interestingly, Qin spent more time arguing against the 
theories of the Liberals than he did the anti-constitutionalists, despite 
the fact that it was the Left that had launched what he called a “fierce 
bombardment” against establishment scholars like himself.  His 
decision to do so might indicate that he viewed the Leftist moment as 
having past, and thus not worthy of detailed scholarly refutation.  Just 
as Party propagandists had turned away from the moderates to train 
their rhetorical fire on the liberal Right, so too did Qin turn away from 
the hard Left, a spent force, to concentrate his energies on Rightist 
liberals.   
Qin also seemed to define constitutionalism downward, 
listing various reforms that the Party had already embraced—
including inner-Party democracy, judicial reform, and new open 
government information regulations—as key elements of 
constitutional development.  Qin seemed less interested in laying out 
specific institutional reforms that the Party might embrace to bring it 
closer to full constitutional enforcement.  
Qin closed with a famous quote from the prominent early 20th 
century scholar Hu Shi: “more study of problems, less talk of isms.”  
“If the Socialist Constitutionalist conceptual debate returns to an 
inquiry into problems,” Qin averred, “I guess Hu Shi would not 
disagree.”  
In referencing Hu Shi in this way, Qin seemed to be speaking 
to his fellow Socialist constitutionalists, nudging them to focus on 
specific reforms that meshed with the Party’s own already-articulated 
agenda, and to avoid larger political debates over China’s future 
reform path.  For Qin and other Socialists, it seemed time to bring the 
2013 Constitutionalist Debate to a close.  
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Just as Autumn Stone’s Seeking Truth article could be seen as 
the Party-state’s signal that the anti-constitutionalist campaign was 
coming to an end, a piece by prominent constitutional scholar and 
People’s University Law School Dean Han Dayuan can be taken as a 
strong signal of the academic community’s return to the pre-2013 
status quo.  That piece, entitled “Crossing the River by Feeling the 
Constitution,” argued that the Party needed to shift its strategy away 
from an experimentalist approach that heavily emphasized pro-
market economic reforms, and instead prioritize the construction of a 
rule-based political system.200   
Perhaps more that Qin, Han emphasized the serious 
problems—including corruption and resistance to legal and 
constitutional rules among local officials—that the Chinese 
leadership currently faces.  Indeed, the title of Han’s piece referred to 
Deng Xiaoping’s famous maxim from the early reform period that 
China should “cross the river”—of market reforms—by “feeling the 
stones.” 201   Han makes clear that constitutional and rule of law 
reforms would are in line with the Party’s own goals, including 
maintaining the “leadership of the Chinese Communist Party.”  
In essence, Han was directing his argument toward the CCP 
leadership, arguing that it should adopt a new reform slogan, one 
which emphasized constitutional values.  In so doing, Han was 
playing the classic moderate role of advising the state, rather than—
as Liberals would do—seeking to harness the reformist energies of 
the Chinese people to push bottom-up reforms.  Indeed, for Han, a 
key step toward constitutional implementation is “cultivating the 
constitutional awareness of civil servants, especially leading 
cadres.” 202   Han’s articulation of a more traditional top-down 
approach was yet another signal of a return to the pre-2013 status quo.  
Finally, Han’s piece was notable as much for what it did not 
say as for what it did.  Han did not mention Yang Xiaoqing by name, 
nor did he extensively engage with Leftist arguments at any point, 
making his piece perhaps one of the first that did not take Yang’s 
attack—or, for that matter, the 2013 constitutionalism debate as a 
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whole—as its jumping-off point for a broader discussion.203  Indeed, 
Han’s piece almost entirely ignores the 2013 debate, which likely 
signals that, for Han, that debate is over, and it is time to return to the 
concerns that animated academic constitutionalist discourse before 
the debate began, including, first and foremost, the need to educate 
officials on constitutional values.  
Virtually all of the responses by the Socialists reaffirmed 
support for the Party-led constitutional development path.  From the 
Party’s perspective, these various responses also—most likely by 
design—switched the terms of the debate away from key questions 
of implementation, like how to construct a workable mechanism for 
enforcement of constitutional rights, and toward the (to the Party) 
much more amenable ground of the true compatibility of Socialism 
and constitutionalism.  
At bottom, however, such interventions—which, in essence, 
are trying to win an academic and somewhat esoteric argument over 
the compatibility of Socialism and constitutionalism – may miss the 
point.  The barriers to constitutional development in contemporary 
China are not theoretical, but rather political—at present, the Party 
has chosen not to move forward with a constitutional reform agenda, 
one that would, for the first time in the history of the People’s 
Republic, put institutional constraints on the Party’s exercise of 
political power.  And here, all too real limits on academic freedom in 
China may come into play: many Chinese constitutional law scholars 
may well feel, not without basis, that they would encounter very 
serious professional and even personal risks were they to try to 
analyze these difficult political dynamics in print.   
Constitutional law scholarship that seeks to contribute to 
constitutional development in China must address this very difficult 
political question of the Party’s reluctance to embrace a true 
constitutional reform agenda, rather than focusing exclusively on 
more narrow theoretical concerns.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                               
203 Han does mention, at least in passing, those on the left who “refuse to let go of their 
vested interests,” and who “seem to persist in ‘Marxisim,’ [but who] essentially deviate from 
fundamental concepts of Marxism, and cling tenaciously to conservative, backward concepts 
and behavioral styles.”  Id.  As with Ge Weikun and others, Han, too, links Leftists to vested 
interests who oppose Xi Jinping’s reform agenda.  
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VI. CONCLUSION: PARTY CONSTITUTIONALIST 
PROPAGANDA RETURNS 
 
Throughout most of 2014, constitutionalism remained largely 
absent from official discourse.  It was not until September that 
constitutional terminology made a limited return: in a speech marking 
the 60th anniversary of the founding of the National People’s 
Congress, Communist Party Chairman Xi Jinping declared that “[t]he 
Constitution is the most basic law of our country.  Rule of the nation 
by law means, first and foremost, ruling the nation in accord with the 
constitution; governing by laws is first and foremost, governing in 
accord with the constitution.”204  Though Xi’s speech was published 
in full in official media, both print and electronic media reports on 
the speech neglected to mention Xi’s use of pro-constitutionalist 
rhetoric.205  
Pro-constitutionalist rhetoric was given an even more 
prominent platform in October, when two key phrases—ruling the 
                                                                                                               
204 Qian Gang, Xi’s Missing Terms Emerge Again, CHINA MEDIA PROJECT (Sept. 8, 
2014), http://cmp.hku.hk/2014/09/08/35953/.  It should be noted, however, that, on the 
whole, Xi’s speech hewed largely to more conventional themes, including the leadership 
position of the Communist Party and the need to advance “Socialism with Chinese 
characteristics.”  Various liberal reforms—including legal reform, judicial reform, and 
reform of the People’s Congress system—were counter-balanced by clear qualifiers, such as 
the need for Party oversight of state political and legal institutions.  Xi Jinping (习近平), Zai 
Qingzhu Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Chengli Liushi Zhounian Dahui Shang de 
Jianghua (在庆祝全国人民代表大会成立 60 周年大会上的讲话) [Speech at the 
Conference to Celebrate the 60th Anniversary of the Establishment of the National People’s 
Congress], RENMIN RIBAO (人民日报) [PEOPLE’S DAILY] (Sept. 5, 2014), http://cpc.people.
com.cn/n/2014/0906/c64093-25615123.html.  
205 Qian Gang, Xi’s Missing Terms Emerge Again, CHINA MEDIA PROJECT (Sept. 8, 
2014), http://cmp.hku.hk/2014/09/08/35953/.  For the Xinhua report on Xi’s speech, see Xi 
Jinping (习近平), Zai Qingzhu Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Chengli Liushi Zhounian 
Dahui Shang Fabiao Zhongyao Jianghua (习近平在庆祝全国人民代表大会成立 60 周年
大会上发表重要讲话)  [Xi Jinping Gives an Important Speech at the Conference to 
Celebrate the 60th Anniversary of the Establishment of the National People’s Congress], 
XINHUA (Sept. 5, 2014), http://news.xinhuanet.com/2014-09/05/c_1112382569.htm.  For an 
English-language report on the speech, see Xi Stresses Adherence to China's Political Path 
Ahead of Legislature Anniversary, GLOBAL TIMES (Sept. 6, 2014), http://news.xinhuanet.
com/english/china/2014-09/05/c_133624166.htm.  A full twelve-minute CCTV news report 
on the speech also omitted any reference to Xi’s constitutionalist commentary, despite giving 
extensive coverage to other aspects of the speech.  Xi Jinping Zai Qingzhu Quanguo Renmin 
Daibiao Dahui Chengli 60 Zhou Nian Dahui Shang Fabiao Zhongyao Jianghua (习近平在
庆祝全国人民代表大会成立 60周年大会上发表重要讲话) [Xi Jinping Gives Important 
Speech at 60th Anniversary Celebration of the NPC], SOHU (搜狐), http://tv.sohu.com/
20140905/n404115242.shtml (last visited Oct. 11, 2016).  
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country according to the Constitution and governing according to the 
Constitution – found their way into the final text of the final document 
of the 4th Plenum of the 18th Party Congress.  That document, the 
CCP Central Committee Decision Concerning Some Major 
Questions on Comprehensively Moving Forward on Governing the 
Country According to Law (the "Decision"), was viewed as a step 
forward in that it focused heavily on rule of law and legal reform.206  
The Decision also made reference to constitutional development, 
echoing the language that Xi Jinping used in his September speech 
on “ruling the country in accordance with the constitution” and 
“governing in accordance with the constitution.”  
Though the Decision’s heavy focus on legal reform and its 
references to constitutional governance were welcome, nonetheless, 
taken as a whole, the Decision was by no means a historic, 
trailblazing document.  It affirmed the leadership position of the 
Communist Party, and maintained the Party’s position above the legal 
system and above the law.  For example, the Decision called for 
“strengthening Party leadership over legislation work.”  
That said, many observers pointed to language in the Decision 
which, if acted upon, would strengthen the judiciary and the People’s 
Congress system. 207   The Decision also called for progress on 
“complet[ing] procedures and mechanisms for constitutional 
interpretation,” raising the hope, as Xi’s December 2012 speech had, 
that the Party would finally move forward on the construction of 
institutions which could interpret and enforce constitutional norms, 
including constitutional rights provisions.  Once again, the Party was 
using the Chinese Constitution as a false blueprint, one that would, at 
an undefined point in the future, lead China toward a full embrace of 
constitutional governance.  
Yet without any specific actions to be taken to move forward 
on creating such “procedures and mechanisms,” it seemed likely that 
the Decision’s constitutional reform rhetoric would remain just 
                                                                                                               
206  CCP Central Committee Decision concerning Some Major Questions in 
Comprehensively Moving Governing the Country According to the Law Forward, CHINA 
COPYRIGHT AND MEDIA (Oct. 28, 2014), https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/
2014/10/28/ccp-central-committee-decision-concerning-some-major-questions-in-
comprehensively-moving-governing-the-country-according-to-the-law-forward/ 
(translation).  
207 See Don Clarke, The Fourth Plenum’s “Decision”: My Take, LAW PROFESSORS 
BLOGS NETWORK (Oct. 29, 2014), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/china_law_prof_blog/
2014/10/the-fourth-plenums-decision-my-take.html.  
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that—rhetoric.208  Indeed, the only specific action that the Decision 
called for on constitutionalism was the proposal to declare December 
4 National Constitution Day.  The Standing Committee of the 
National People’s Congress duly took action on this suggestion, and 
December 4, 2014 marked the first-ever observance of National 
Constitution Day across China.209  
Perhaps mindful of the 2013 constitutionalism debate, the 
Party propaganda apparatus made sure to publish concurrently with 
the Decision a warning about what was meant—or, more precisely, 
what was not meant—by the constitutionalist references of the 
Decision.  That same day, October 24, the People’s Daily published 
an editorial by one Guo Ping—a pseudonym—entitled, “Governing 
According to the Constitution Must Not Be Confused with Western 
‘Constitutionalism.’”210  As the title suggests, Guo’s piece argued 
that “in a word, governing according to the constitution is not 
Western ‘constitutionalism.’  In fact, the two are completely different, 
and we cannot allow the fundamental differences between the two to 
be obscured.” Though much more mild in tone than the anti-
constitutionalist attacks of 2013, nonetheless Guo’s piece signaled 
that any attempts to appropriate the Decision’s rhetoric for purposes 
beyond the CCP’s own limited and largely political agenda would not 
be welcome.  
Some have argued that the months-long official silence on 
constitutionalism, followed by sporadic references, suggests a split 
within the Party on the benefits of pro-constitutionalist rhetoric.211  
And, indeed, there is some limited evidence to suggest that some key 
elements within the Party wanted to keep any references to 
                                                                                                               
208  Jerome Cohen, China’s New Constitution Day: Is It Worth Celebrating? 14 
JAMESTOWN CHINA BRIEF, no. 22 (2014), https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-new-
national-constitution-day-is-it-worth-celebrating.  
209 Shannon Tiezzi, For China, Constitution Day Comes Without Constitutionalism, 
DIPLOMAT (Dec. 4, 2014), http://thediplomat.com/2014/12/for-china-constitution-day-
comes-without-constitutionalism/.   
210 Guo Ping (国平), Yixian Zhizheng yu Xifang Xianzheng Burong Hunxiao (依宪执
政与西方“宪政”不容混淆) [Governing According to the Constitution Must Not Be 
Confused with Western ‘Constitutionalism,’], RENMIN RIBAO (人民日报) [PEOPLE’S DAILY] 
(Oct. 24, 2014), http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2014/1024/c70731-25904899.html.  
211 Qian Gang, Xi’s Missing Terms Emerge Again, CHINA MEDIA PROJECT (Sept. 8, 
2014), http://cmp.hku.hk/2014/09/08/35953/ (“One thing we can be quite sure of . . . is that 
there are people within the Party who are unsettled by Xi Jinping’s decision to use these 
[constitutionalist] terms”).  See also Qian Gang, The Missing Speech, CHINA MEDIA PROJECT 
(Sept. 4, 2014), http://cmp.hku.hk/2014/09/04/35905/.  
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Constitutionalism out of the Fourth Plenum Decision, and, most 
likely, out of official Party discourse altogether.212  If true, then this 
disagreement within the Party would mark a small but significant 
setback for Xi Jinping, who is otherwise regarded as having moved 
quickly to consolidate power and to solidify his own political position.  
At the same time, the pattern of official discourse on 
constitutionalism in 2014 is also consistent with prior efforts by the 
Party to use constitutionalist rhetoric as a source of political 
legitimacy.  It is possible that, after the events of 2013, the Party 
decided to wait for a period of months before returning to pro-
constitutionalist propaganda.  In so doing, it allowed any lingering 
memories of the Leftist push to recede, thus ensuring that its renewed 
constitutionalist rhetoric in September and October would not be 
tainted by association with those far-from-mainstream views.  
The fact that it published the pro-constitutionalist Decision 
and the more cautious warning by the pseudonymous Guo Ping on 
the same day speaks to the authoritarian constitutional dilemma that 
the Party continues to face: it wants to make use of pro-
constitutionalist rhetoric, but it cannot hit such notes too hard, for fear 
that some listeners might take its rhetoric at face value, and seek to 
use that rhetoric to force the Party to act on a full-fledged 
constitutional agenda, something that it believes that it cannot do.  
The need to proceed with caution in the face of such a 
dilemma also explains the lack of prominent coverage given to the 
constitutionalist sentiments in Xi Jinping’s September 5, 2014 speech.  
The authoritarian constitutionalist dilemma also likely explains why 
Party-controlled media outlets devoted much more attention to the 
rule of law elements of the Fourth Plenum Decision, and gave relative 
short shrift to the constitutionalist content.213  
Overall, the use of pro-constitutionalist rhetoric is a minor 
part of Xi Jinping’s political strategy.  Roughly four years into his 
tenure as China’s supreme leader, the outlines of Xi’s agenda are now 
clearer: his administration remains heavily focused on the anti-
corruption campaign and on solidifying Party control over virtually 
all important aspects of Chinese life.  Over the past four years, there 
has been a heavy emphasis on tightening up on civil society, and on 
exerting greater control over the vehicles of public discourse, 
                                                                                                               
212 Qian Gang, A Backstage Glimpse at the Plenum ‘Decision,’ CHINA MEDIA PROJECT 
(Nov. 10, 2014), http://cmp.hku.hk/2014/11/10/37015/.  
213 Qian Gang, China’s Constitution Roller-Coaster, CHINA MEDIA PROJECT (Nov. 6, 
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including the internet and the media.  At the same time, a limited set 
of legal reforms, along the lines of those put forward in the Decision, 
are a smaller but still significant part of Xi’s reform plans.   At least 
as of this writing, it seems that any meaningful political system 
reform, including constitutional reform, is not on part of Xi Jinping’s 
agenda.  
It may well be the case that the mix of a hard-hitting anti-
corruption campaign and tighter political cointrols will be enough to 
preserve the Party’s political legitimacy, such that it is able to 
maintain public support even in the face of slowing economic growth 
and limited progress on political-legal reform.  
Yet, the 2013 Constitutionalism Debate demonstrated the 
deep-seated desire among many Chinese intellectuals, as well as an 
uncountable number of Chinese citizens, for genuine constitutional 
reform, including the development of institutions that would limit the 
Party’s arbitrary authority, and would, for the first time, put political 
power in China in an institutional cage.  Time and time again, the 
Party responds to this desire with pro-constitutional promises that are 
never quite fulfilled.  While this formula has worked well enough 
over the past three decades, it is showing signs of age.  It may be time 
for the Party to acknowledge this, and move from a false 
constitutional blueprint to a real one.  
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